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ESSAY
MANAGING MORAL RISK: THE CASE OF CONTRACT
Aditi Bagchi*
The concept of moral luck describes how the moral character of our ac-
tions seems to depend on factors outside our control. Implications of moral
luck have been extensively explored in criminal law and tort law, but there is
no literature on moral luck in contract law. This Essay shows that contract
law is an especially illuminating domain for the study of moral luck because
it highlights that moral luck is not just a conundrum to solve, deny, or
ignore. We anticipate moral luck, that is, manage our moral risk, when we
take into account the possibility that our actions might result in serious harm
to others for which we would be morally responsible and adjust our conduct
accordingly. Moral risk is present in contract both at the stage of contract
formation and, later, when a party must decide whether to breach or whether
to accommodate a request for modification. Parties negotiate these risks both
through collective background institutions that limit the harms they can in-
flict on others and through the rules of contract law itself, which align mate-
rial and moral interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Moral luck describes the effect that events outside our control have
on the normative upshot of our actions, or at least how others credit and
blame us for those actions.1 Our ordinary actions are subject to ordinary
luck, in that events outside of our control determine whether those acts
ultimately increase or decrease our wealth, well-being, or happiness.
These ordinary actions are also subject to moral luck, in that events
outside of our control determine whether these actions improve or de-
tract from our standing as moral agents. Ever since Bernard Williams and
Thomas Nagel first introduced the concept of moral luck, scholars have
debated whether it exists and, if so, how devastating it is for longstanding
conceptions of morality.2 Legal scholars have debated whether the con-
1. See Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions 24–38 (Canto ed. 1991) [hereinafter Nagel,
Mortal Questions] (defining concept of moral luck and exploring challenge it poses for
Kantian moral theory); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck 20–39 (1981) [hereinafter Williams,
Moral Luck] (same). Together, these works introduced the concept and founded the
literature on moral luck.
2. See, e.g., Moral Luck (Daniel Statman ed., 1993) (exploring various dimensions of
moral luck in collection of articles); Robert Merrihew Adams, Involuntary Sins, 94 Phil.
Rev. 3, 3 (1985) (arguing one may be morally responsible for involuntary states of mind);
Jonathan E. Adler, Luckless Desert Is Different Desert, 96 Mind 247, 247 (1987)
(defending problem of moral luck on grounds that there is “imperfect alignment of our
ideals for attributing desert and the practices in which those attributions are rooted”);
Brynmor Browne, A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck, 42 Phil. Q. 345, 345 (1992)
(arguing it is mistaken to understand problem of moral luck as based on assumption that
moral responsibility requires control by agent); Randolph Clarke, Agent Causation and the
Problem of Luck, 86 Pac. Phil. Q. 408, 408 (2005) (defending agent causation against
argument that one’s very decision to act one way or the other is matter of luck); Darren
Domsky, There Is No Door: Finally Solving the Problem of Moral Luck, 101 J. Phil. 445,
446 (2004) (denying problem of moral luck because “[b]lameworthiness does not vary
with luck in cases of negligence”); David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, The Case Against Moral
Luck, 26 Law & Phil. 405, 410–11 (2007) (rejecting problem of moral luck on grounds that
agent is not properly regarded as responsible for all causally connected consequences of
her acts); Alfred R. Mele, Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck, 16 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y
274, 275 (1999) (defending notion of ultimate responsibility and moral responsibility
against specific deterministic challenges); Brian Rosebury, Moral Responsibility and
“Moral Luck,” 104 Phil. Rev. 499, 524 (1995) (arguing there is no problem of moral luck
once one recognizes “moral agents are to be judged in light of knowledge available to
them at point of decision to act, given acknowledged underlying condition of universal
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cept of moral luck poses fundamental challenges for tort law3 and crimi-
nal law.4
This Essay considers how we deal with moral luck—not theoretically,
or psychologically, but in the course of individual and collective action.
Accepting that moral luck is indeed a fundamental challenge to the com-
mon and deeply held belief that morality ought not to be subject to luck,
it suggests that political and legal practices already limit the ways in
which, as Williams and Nagel argue, moral standing is in fact subject to
luck. Just as individuals navigate uncertainty as to the material outcomes
of their actions when they choose to take ordinary risks, they anticipate
the uncertain moral repercussions of their actions when they assume
what this Essay calls moral risk. This Essay proposes that legal rules and
other institutions help manage the risk that actions of contracting parties
will result in negative moral responsibility.
The law helps manage moral risk in contract. Background institu-
tions—such as distributive tax and transfer regimes, mandatory insurance
and insurance regulations, and bankruptcy protections—provide a social
safety net, or social insurance, that tempers the material risks that individ-
fallibility in pursuit and deployment of knowledge”); Michael Zimmerman, Taking Luck
Seriously, 99 J. Phil. 553, 562 (2002) (arguing “anyone who takes seriously the view that we
cannot be morally responsible for that which is not in our control must . . . accept the
more general claim that luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility” and suggesting practice
of punishment must be revised accordingly).
3. See generally Larry A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law
Make Sense?, 6 Law & Phil. 1, 22–23 (1987) [hereinafter Alexander, Corrective Justice]
(arguing backward-looking focus of “but-for” causation inquiry in tort law is unjustified);
Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12 Legal Theory
181, 181 (2006) (arguing corrective justice and existing tort law are unjust to both
defendants and plaintiffs because damages depend on arbitrary factors); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1123,
1132–63 (2007) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Tort Law] (rejecting arguments that
tort law is unjust because wrongdoers’ compliance and liability both turn on luck); Jeremy
Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort
Law 387, 389–91 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) [hereinafter Waldron, Moments of
Carelessness] (arguing massive liability imposed on individuals for ordinary negligence is
morally arbitrary).
4. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Completed
Crimes, 5 Law & Phil. 1, 28–32 (1986) (defending differential punishment for attempts on
grounds that criminals who have not successfully completed their crimes have not usurped
same advantage as those who have accomplished their crimes); Joel Feinberg, Equal
Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 Ariz.
L. Rev. 117, 119 (1995) [hereinafter Feinberg, Equal Punishment] (arguing attempts and
completed crimes should be treated equally because arbitrariness has corrosive effect on
criminal law); Stanley Kadish, Forward: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 679, 679 (1994) (arguing harm principle at work in array of
criminal law doctrines is indefensible); David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves
Something to Chance, 96 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 53, 58 (1989) (suggesting we can understand
less severe punishment for attempts as kind of penal lottery, in which criminal who
commits given act is subject to risk of punitive harm that turns in part on harm he
commits).
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uals face in the labor and capital markets.5 This has the effect of attenuat-
ing the range of outcomes that contracting parties may experience; that
is to say, background institutions limit the consequences of individual
transactions, or their cumulative effect, on each of the contracting par-
ties. For example, when the system works, an employer can set employ-
ment terms with reference to the labor market without worrying about
whether compensation will be adequate to support a decent standard of
living for a given employee in light of her particular, evolving needs. By
lowering the stakes of contract, background institutions mitigate the
moral risk to each party that her dealings with others will render her
responsible for their misfortunes.6
While background institutions reduce the risk that contracting on a
given set of terms will result in negative moral responsibility, contract law
itself helps mitigate the risk that post-contract events will make it rational
for a party to breach or request modification. By opting into contract,
parties help frame the choices they may face should circumstances make
breach attractive to them or cause the other party to request modifica-
tion. Choosing contract over extralegal promise, and thereby subjecting
themselves to the prevailing regime of contract remedies, limits the eco-
nomic harm that parties might later be tempted to inflict should they
pursue their economic interests at the expense of their contracting part-
ner. For example, a factory owner who promises to deliver widgets to a
retailer by a fixed date may learn of an opportunity to redirect her re-
sources to a more lucrative order. In the classic efficient breach analysis,
an expectations damages award will usually cause the producer to breach
his initial promise to deliver widgets if and only if her increased gains
from the alternative widget contract exceed the losses of her initial con-
tracting partner, which she will have to cover.7 But one may also charac-
5. See David M. Cutler & Richard Johnson, The Birth and Growth of the Social
Insurance State: Explaining Old Age and Medical Insurance Across Countries, 120 Pub.
Choice 87, 88, 91–96 (2004) (providing overview of political and economic theories of
social insurance); Mark Huggett & Juan Carlos Parra, How Well Does the U.S. Social
Insurance System Provide Social Insurance?, 118 J. Pol. Econ. 76, 76–77 (2010) (“One
rationale for a government-provided, insurance system is the provision of insurance for
risks that are not easily insured in private markets.”). For economic literature explaining
social insurance as a response to the inadequacy of private insurance for labor market risk,
see J.A. Mirrlees, Private Risk and Public Action: The Economics of the Welfare State, 39
Eur. Econ. Rev. 383, 384, 388 (1995) (summarizing social insurance as response to
problems of adverse selection and impossibility of individuals purchasing insurance
privately at optimal time of birth). See generally Greg Warren Kaplan, Essays in Inequality,
Risk-Sharing and the Lifecycle (May 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York
University) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing different models of risk
sharing to deal with labor market risk).
6. See infra Part IV.A (suggesting background institutions mitigate moral risk
inherent in contract formation by providing social safety net).
7. See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obligations should be
encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee
in as good a position as he would have occupied had performance been rendered.”);
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terize the damages rule as making it possible (and easy, relative to other
possible default rules) for the factory owner to manage, at the time of her
initial promise, the moral risk that she will later be tempted to break that
promise. By entering a legally binding commitment subject to the expec-
tation damages rule, she makes it less likely that she will inflict economic
loss on her contracting partner should new opportunities arise that cause
her to regret their initial contract.
The economic harm that the availability of damages protects against
may not constitute the core harm that results from ordinary promise
breaking, but it is the key harm of concern in connection with breach of
commercial promises.8 In tying parties’ hands through contract, the law
not only facilitates credible commitments among business partners, but
also keeps their material and moral interests in rough alignment.
The contract law doctrine of impracticability makes it easier to de-
cide—from a moral point of view—how to respond to another party’s
request to modify contract terms. Contract makes it possible for a party to
escape her obligations in those cases where the other party’s refusal to
modify would be most damaging to her, which in turn makes it difficult
for the other party to avoid modification in circumstances where it would
be most morally appropriate.9 The result is to make less morally hazard-
ous the decision whether to acquiesce to a request for a modification of
the original agreement. For example, if a contractor seeks a price adjust-
ment due to unforeseen difficulties that would subject her to a substantial
loss at the contract price, a homeowner may acquiesce to an appropriate
adjustment in part because the homeowner’s legal remedies should the
contractor breach are at least uncertain.10 Contract rules governing
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554, 558 (1977) (“Generally, breach will occur where the
breaching party anticipates that paying compensation and allocating his resources to
alternative uses will make him ‘better off’ than performing his obligation.”); Steven
Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466, 478 (1980)
[hereinafter Shavell, Damage Measures] (“The seller will default if and only if his gain
exceeds the buyer’s expectancy . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
8. See 24 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 64:7 (Richard A.
Lord ed., 4th ed. 2002) (“Mental suffering caused by a breach of contract, although it may
be a real injury, is not generally considered as a basis for compensation in contractual
actions.”); R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the
Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1789, 1789 (2000) (“[C]ontract law . . . [is] expressly designed to deal with
disappointed economic expectations and, therefore, the recovery of economic losses.”).
9. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 89, 261–268 (1981) (outlining
circumstances under which performance of promise is difficult or impossible). Section 261
holds that a party’s obligation may be discharged if performance “is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made.” Id. § 261.
10. Consider a contractor who asks a homeowner to increase the contract price to
$12,000 from $10,000 because the poor state of the existing plumbing will require a variety
of pipes to be replaced before the planned work can proceed. The expected duration of
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changed circumstances—rules that the homeowner and the contractor
adopted by entering a contract and by not specifying alternatives where
possible—relieve the homeowner of the choice to impose substantial
losses on the contractor. The psychological consequence of one’s ability
to manage moral risk is to temper the moral salience of decisions in
contract.
This Essay does not suggest that social policy or contract law itself is
directly motivated by a desire to manage moral risk. Complicated institu-
tions are variously motivated, and perform a still greater variety of prag-
matic and moral functions. The purpose of this Essay is to explain the
notion of moral risk, locate it in the practice of contract, and demon-
strate how it is already managed by existing institutions. Moral risk gener-
ally, and in the context of contract in particular, has been easy to over-
look precisely because of the background work of large social and legal
institutions that are usually associated with other purposes. When those
institutions effectively limit the harm done to others, individuals are less
likely to dwell on those potential harms in the course of everyday deci-
sions, including choices made in the course of contract.
Part I describes the problem of moral luck and the possibility of
managing moral risk. Part II considers whether moral luck can survive
consent by the very person whom one is “at risk” of wronging. Part III
identifies the ways in which moral risk operates in both contract forma-
tion and contract performance. Finally, Part IV discusses how social insti-
tutions and contract law in particular help manage moral risk. Part V
concludes.
I. MANAGING MORAL RISK
A. The Challenge of Moral Luck
The concept of moral luck was introduced by Bernard Williams.11 In
his seminal article naming the concept, Williams set out to challenge the
prevailing orthodoxy that while much of life is subject to luck, in the all-
important domain of morality one is free of it.12 The exclusion of matters
of luck from moral affairs has been so foundational as to be almost defini-
the work was not specified in the written agreement. The contractor may have been in a
better position to appreciate the significance of existing conditions, but the homeowner
was in a better position to know of conditions behind a wall. It is therefore unclear whether
the contractor could successfully avoid the contract on the grounds of mistake of fact or
some variety of changed circumstances. The possibility that the contractor may escape
liability for breach makes it more likely that the homeowner will acquiesce to some
modification that pools the harms associated with the poor quality of the existing
plumbing.
11. See Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 1, at 20–39 (noting “morality is subject . . . R
to constitutive luck” and exploring moral luck through series of examples).
12. See id. at 21, 29 (“[T]he aim of making morality immune to luck is bound to be
disappointed.”).
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tional.13 That something was a matter of luck was taken to demonstrate
that it was, in at least that respect, not a moral issue. This view of morality
has ancient roots,14 but was most notably advanced by Kant, who in a
sense set out to provide an account of morality that could be divorced
from worldly contingency.15 Kant suggested that moral reasoning ex-
presses and embodies freedom because morality exists in the domain of
reason, and through reason a domain can be created separate from
worldly causation and contingency.16 Thus, in Kantian morality, much is
at stake in the separation of morality and luck.17
In light of these stakes, the challenge of moral luck was not an espe-
cially welcome one. As Williams was quick to point out, the challenge
could not “leave the concept of morality where it was.”18 Moral luck dis-
rupted and threatened basic tenets of both ordinary and theoretical
13. See Nafsika Athanassoulis, Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck, 8
Ethical Theory & Moral Prac. 265, 265 (2005) (noting “morality . . . is about control,
choice, responsibility and the appropriateness of praise and blame and on the other hand
luck . . . is about lack of control, unpredictability and the inappropriateness of praise and
blame”); A.W. Moore, A Kantian View of Moral Luck, 65 Philosophy 297, 297–98 (1990)
(observing Kant and Plato share “the belief that our true worth, indeed our true being, is
something isolable and pure which is not subject to the contingencies and vicissitudes of
our empirical surrounds”).
14. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. I, ch. 9, §7 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (“[I]t would be seriously inappropriate to entrust what is greatest
and finest to fortune.”); John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle 123 (1975)
(“Aristotle points out that the actual attainment of external goods is in large measure the
result of sheer good fortune; but eudaimonia [human flourishing] must be something
which is attained, if at all, by a person’s own efforts.”); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility
of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy 1–8 (1986) (discussing
dichotomy between luck and human goodness in Greek ethical thought); see also Julia
Annas, Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality, 6 Ethics 119, 125 (1992) (“[V]irtue requires
voluntariness, the free exercise of choice to act one way rather than another.”).
15. See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 20 (James W.
Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785) [hereinafter Kant, Grounding]
(“[M]oral law . . . must be valid not merely under contingent conditions and with
exceptions but must be absolutely necessary.”). The moral theory is complex and cannot
be adequately treated here. A brutally reductive version of the argument is that human
beings may be motivated by desires that are the product of the external world and subject
to the natural laws of the physical world. To the extent our actions are guided merely by
these desires, we do not act freely but are subject to laws outside ourselves. Only when we
subject our will to the internal law of reason, i.e., the categorical imperative, do we act
freely. See also Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 239–42 (1990) (discussing
deduction of freedom from moral law in Kant’s theory); Christine M. Korsgaard, The
Authority of Reflection, in The Sources of Normativity 90, 97–98 (Onara O’Neill ed., 1996)
[hereinafter Korsgaard, Reflection] (“[B]ecause the will is free, no law or principle can be
imposed on it from outside.”).
16. Kant, Grounding, supra note 15, at vi–viii. R
17. See Judith Andre, Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck, 43 Analysis 202, 202 (1983)
(describing Kantian view that morality is “the sphere of life in which, no matter what our
circumstances, each of us can become worthy” and suggesting “moral worth is the highest
worth of all, and so there is a kind of ultimate justice in the world”).
18. Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 1, at 39. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-8\COL805.txt unknown Seq: 8 22-NOV-11 14:25
2011] MANAGING MORAL RISK 1885
moral thinking.19 That, indeed, was Williams’s aim.20 Williams sought to
dislodge moral theory’s focus on universal accounts of right and wrong
action and to replace it with attention to individual reflection about one’s
own actions. According to Williams, a person’s rational justification of his
own actions to himself is the better site of moral theory. He wished to
demonstrate that this type of reflection necessarily and appropriately
turns on matters of luck, especially how one’s actions, undertaken with
various purposes, actually turn out.21 When actions turn out such that, in
hindsight, one would have rather not committed them, one experiences
what he calls agent-regret.22
In his equally well-known reply to Williams, Thomas Nagel was un-
willing to give up the traditional account of morality centered on how
individuals can and should justify their voluntary acts to one another.23
Nagel, nevertheless, identified four systematic ways in which luck per-
vades the moral sphere.24 First, constitutive luck concerns the “kind of
person you are, where this is not a question of what you deliberately do,
but of your inclinations, capacities, and temperament.”25 Second, circum-
stantial luck concerns “the things we are called upon to do, the moral
tests we face.”26 Third, causal luck is concerned with all that determines
what we (choose to) do.27 Finally, the most well-known, resultant luck,
covers the uncertain outcomes of our actions.28 These four kinds of luck
overlap considerably but nevertheless help map out the many paths by
which arbitrary factors contaminate the moral domain.
Nagel’s version of moral luck calls for less wholesale revision of the
basic tenets of Kantian moral theory than Williams’s account. Nagel did
not come to terms with moral luck by rejecting the proposition that
moral blame attaches only where conduct is blameworthy in the eyes of
others for reasons that can be articulated at the time of the action in
question. Williams’s aim in raising the problem of moral luck was to re-
19. It disrupted theoretical understandings of morality, which take moral agency to
entail control over the moral quality of actions. See supra note 13 (discussing importance R
of individual control to conceptions of morality). It similarly disrupted the basic intuition
that many have that we ought not to be credited or blamed for things beyond our control.
See Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency, in Moral
Luck, supra note 2 at 235, 237 (describing “‘control condition,’ the intuitive principle R
limiting moral assessment to just such factors as an agent controls” as “held to be virtually
self-evident”).
20. See Daniel Statman, Introduction, in Moral Luck, supra note 2, at 1, 6 (noting R
normative aspect of Williams’s agent-regret theory).
21. Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 1, at 36. R
22. Id. at 27.
23. Nagel, Mortal Questions, supra note 1, at 27. R
24. Id. at 28.
25. Id.; see also Adams, supra note 2, at 3–4 (arguing individuals should be held R
ethically accountable for “involuntary sins”).
26. Nagel, Mortal Questions, supra note 1, at 33. R
27. Id. at 33–34.
28. Id. at 35.
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ject precisely this orthodoxy,29 but it was further than Nagel was prepared
to go. Instead, Nagel saw the problem of moral luck as part of a larger,
unavoidable tension in the desire to see oneself as separate from the
world and under one’s own control, but also of the world, constituted by
it, and capable of acting on it and in it.30 Nagel suggested that, to the
extent one sees oneself as separate and apart from everything outside
oneself, one wishes moral standing to be within one’s control, but to the
extent one sees oneself as connected with the world, one accepts respon-
sibility for one’s imprint on the world, however imperfectly it reflects
one’s internal image. Subsequent authors have also justified moral re-
sponsibility for outcomes outside one’s control as expressive of agency in
the world, though distinct from moral judgments of culpability and
blame.31
B. Taking Moral Risks
This section begins with two observations about the operation of
moral luck. First, moral luck is not necessarily a matter of luck per se, but
rather luck from the perspective of the individual upon whom it acts in a
given instance. Discussion of moral luck is generally focused on natural
luck, that is, noninstitutionally generated or controlled sources of luck,
such as whether a pedestrian embarks on an ill-fated street crossing,
whether a child drowns in running water, or whether a gun misfires.32
But moral luck is often traceable to factors that are morally arbitrary in
29. Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 1, at 37, 39.
30. Nagel, Mortal Questions, supra note 1, at 37–38. R
31. See Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 Law Q. Rev. 530, 543 (1988) (“If
actions and outcomes were not ascribed to us on the basis of our bodily movements and
their mental accompaniments, we could have no continuing history or character.”); see
also John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in Relating to
Responsibility: Essays for Tony Honoré on His Eightieth Birthday 111, 136 (Peter Cane &
John Gardner eds., 2001) [hereinafter Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes] (“To deny
that success can have independent rational significance is to leave us without any story of
our lives as practical reasoners.”); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law,
77 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 505–07 (1992) [hereinafter Perry, Moral Foundations] (arguing
agency is “meaningful notion” because one can imagine agent with knowledge of all
relevant causal regularities who is capable of controlling natural processes, and observing
outcome responsibility involves “retrospective evaluation of action” that turns on what
would have been foreseeable to such an idealized agent); Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility
for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in Philosophy and the Law of Torts 72, 83
(Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) [hereinafter Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes]
(“[O]utcome-responsibility in the achievement sense comprises a fundamental element in
our understanding of our own agency.”).
32. See, e.g., Nagel, Mortal Questions, supra note 1, at 25, 30–31 (considering R
scenarios where drunk driver kills pedestrian and baby is left in running bathwater); Berit
Brogaard, Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck, 84 Pac. Phil. Q.
351, 351 (2003) (considering situation in which driver with uninspected brakes kills
pedestrian); Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong?, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 157,
176 (1994) (expanding upon misfiring gun example).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-8\COL805.txt unknown Seq: 10 22-NOV-11 14:25
2011] MANAGING MORAL RISK 1887
their particular interventions in the lives of individuals, but are in fact
systemic.
For example, whether one hits a person as a result of reckless driving
is, in part, a function of natural luck, but the full outcome of one’s reck-
lessness—which the concept of moral luck acknowledges as relevant to its
ultimate moral salience—will turn on traffic laws, traffic enforcement, pe-
destrian norms, the healthcare system, and the insurance or other bene-
fits available to those dependent on the victim. All of these latter factors
are morally arbitrary from the standpoint of an individual’s agency, but
they help determine whether the driver has committed a minor or griev-
ous wrong. What is notable, but generally overlooked, is that none of
these factors is truly arbitrary. Each is the function of collective decisions
about how social institutions should function. Some, but not all, of the
relevant institutions are engineered by legal rules.
The second observation about moral luck is that, precisely because
moral luck is pervasive, where the potential moral upshot of an action is
especially salient, one anticipates its uncertain effect on one’s act. Individ-
uals anticipate this uncertainty much as they anticipate—and incorporate
into their decision to act—other uncertainties relevant to the merits of
their actions. Such considerations include whether one is likely to suc-
ceed in accomplishing an act as envisioned and what its amoral conse-
quences could be. Examples of moral luck in the literature tend to be
cases of bad moral luck that hit a moral agent like lightning (suddenly,
someone runs into the street, rendering everyday negligence morally
shattering), or good moral luck that goes unacknowledged (everyday
negligence occurs, no one is killed, and no lucky stars are thanked).33
But moral luck normally operates at less extreme frequencies: The out-
comes of our actions are unknowable, but the fact of uncertainty is
known and appreciated.34
33. Cf. Ken Levy, The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as
Punishable as the Wrongful Action that Causes It, 24 Law & Phil. 263, 265 (2005)
(describing how actors knowingly assume risk of “metaphysical luck” in certain situations
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Levy defends the centrality of outcome to criminal
liability on the grounds that those who engage in risky criminal behavior assume the risk
that their actions will result in harms that justify criminal punishment. He stresses, as does
this Essay, that just as a gambler risks that she will have poor “metaphysical luck” that will
result in monetary loss, someone who shoots a gun gambles with the “dealer of morality.”
Id. at 265. An agent who engages in behavior that puts others in harm’s way “voluntarily
create[s] a situation” that she “[knows] or at least should have known would let the moral
status of her action be determined by one or another reasonably foreseeable outcome of
her action.” Id. at 303.
34. The failure to recognize the ways in which we continually manage moral risk
follows in part from our tendency to associate ordinary luck with extreme, unanticipated
outcomes. Cf. Anders Schinkel, The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against Its
Epistemic Reduction, 12 Ethical Theory & Moral Prac. 267, 269 (2009) (“We call
something a matter of (good or bad) luck when 1) it is of interest or importance to us, 2) it
was not under our control, and 3) we had no reason to expect its occurrence.”).
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As a result, moral uncertainty is a factor in decisionmaking by moral
agents. This insight is lost upon, or perhaps uncomfortable for, those
committed to the priority of moral principles in decisionmaking, because
that priority might be mistaken to require that no action that may result
in unjustified wrong to another is permissible. But most people under-
stand moral duties to require less; one must not impose unreasonable
risks on others.35 When a reasonable risk results in great harm to an-
other, however, it is the insight of the concept of moral luck and related
literature that one is nevertheless morally on the hook, or at least re-
garded as such by both oneself and others.36 The result is that even when
one acts reasonably, one acts knowing that one may commit wrongs, or at
least incur negative responsibility. Even acts that are wrongful on facts
known at the moment of commission may turn out to be more or less
serious wrongs; the wrongdoer gambles accordingly. Individuals deliber-
ately act in ways that expose them to moral luck, and this conscious nego-
tiation of moral luck may be called moral risk taking.
Moral risk taking is the knowing undertaking of actions that may or
may not result in moral opprobrium, which is to say, most actions. But
the term should connote more conscious risk taking than the more fun-
damental concept of moral luck may allow. Every act is subject to moral
luck. But only some actions are properly understood as entailing moral
risk. When one takes moral risk, one understands that by engaging in an
act or activity one is at risk of committing moral wrongs, and that fact of
risk is part of one’s ordinary calculations in deciding whether to under-
take the activity, how often, and with what care.
C. The Possibility of Managing Moral Risk
If one bites the bullet and accepts the existence of moral luck, it
cannot be denied that luck matters to moral judgments. But one can
maintain that luck ought not to matter. That is, it is morally attractive to
minimize the extent that luck determines the moral quality of actions. To
35. See Jules L. Coleman, Contracts and Torts, 12 Law & Phil. 71, 90–93 (1993)
(exploring requirement that one impose only “reasonable risk” as neither fully
encompassing nor limited to cost-justified risks, and expressly allowing that imposition of
such risk may be justified). Of course, there is substantial disagreement on what constitutes
unreasonable risk. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 238–39 (1992)
[hereinafter Coleman, Risks & Wrongs] (“[T]he agent who fails to take cost-justified
precautions acts unreasonably, and the risks he imposes are unreasonable.”); Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 152–60 (1973) (“If the defendant
harms the plaintiff, then he should pay even if the risk he took was reasonable . . . .”);
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 542–56
(1972) (“[A] victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree
and different in order from those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant—in
short, for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks.”).
36. Cf. Daniel Statman, Doors, Keys, and Moral Luck: A Reply to Domsky, 102 J. Phil.
422, 423–24 (2005) (explaining there is more to problem of moral luck than
blameworthiness).
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concede that luck matters is not to concede that it is not a matter of
degree and whether its role is greater or smaller matters morally. The
Kantian picture of morality is attractive in part because it draws on the
intuition that an individual should be able to control her moral status.
This may be an ideal that cannot be actualized, but it also serves as a
guiding principle that weighs in favor of promoting certainty. Certainty is
created by developing protective mechanisms, whether private insurance,
social insurance, or safety belts. All of these make the accidents we cause
less calamitous for those who we injure. They truncate the wild card varia-
ble of outcome in moral judgments of action.
One might be tempted to think that moral luck may be eliminated
altogether through these mechanisms. For example, Tom Baker has ar-
gued that liability insurance effectively eliminates the liability luck associ-
ated with auto accidents.37 He argues that mandatory insurance, the indi-
vidual cost of which is largely insensitive to one’s past accidents, ensures
that drivers are almost always able to compensate victims with widely vary-
ing injuries at a fixed, predetermined cost to themselves.38 Baker’s focus
is on the effect of insurance on the luck of drivers, rather than its effect
on the luck of victims,39 but the insurance scheme he describes is of sig-
nificance to both; mandatory insurance has a leveling effect on victims as
well. Baker himself does not claim that insurance eliminates moral luck,
but one might be tempted to extend his point regarding liability luck to
moral luck on the theory that insurance guarantees that all victims are
fully compensated and therefore unharmed. This would be a mistake.
The moral consequences to a driver involved in a serious accident are not
“undone” by financial compensation to the victim. Financial compensa-
tion fulfills a remedial obligation that arises from the injury and, where
commensurate to ascertainable losses, alters the moral quality of the acci-
dent (hence the possibility of mitigating moral risk), but it does not undo
the accident. No social policy or market mechanism can dissipate moral
luck. But institutions, policies, and legal rules may alter the scale of havoc
it wreaks on ordinary moral judgment and everyday action.
Note that the idea that one can mitigate moral risk follows from the
critical insight that outcomes matter to the moral character of action.40 A
moral framework in which the morality of an action turns entirely on the
agent’s mental state—will, intention, or purpose—does not allow for so-
cial instruments to elevate or detract from individual morality (except,
perhaps, through the inculcation of virtue). But moral luck paints a pic-
37. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents, 9 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 165, 166 (2008).
38. Id. at 172–75.
39. See id. at 184 (shifting discussion away from luck of drivers to luck of victims).
40. That is, the principle of moral luck implies that outcomes affect the moral quality
of acts. Negative outcomes may be mitigated by social institutions like law; therefore, these
institutions may help mitigate the risk that luck will render us vulnerable to moral
opprobrium.
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ture of morality in which outcomes matter morally to the agents that set
in motion causal chains culminating in those outcomes. This opens the
door to the possibility that the state enhances individual morality (with or
without that purpose) not through persuasion or incentives, but through
policies that make the potential negative consequences of certain kinds
of individual action more predictable and less devastating. Consider
Williams’s well-known early example of the moral luck of the artist Gau-
guin: The moral character of Gauguin’s abandonment of his family de-
pends not just on how his art turns out, but also on what befalls his fam-
ily.41 A welfare state that renders his absence emotionally but not
financially disastrous would mitigate the magnitude of his wrong. Simi-
larly, if the moral character of leaving a baby in a running bath depends
on whether the baby survives, safe baby bath seats that make it less likely
that water will ever reach the baby’s mouth could make less terrible the
baby’s brute luck and also dampen her caregiver’s bad moral luck.42
That moral luck can be reduced seems counterintuitive only because
the concept of moral luck has not fully dislodged the Kantian notion that
morality is immune to the vagaries of the tangible world.43 But moral luck
is only a problem to the extent that it has chipped away at that picture,
and it is precisely to that extent that moral luck is open to mitigation by
the banal instruments available in the concrete world of contingency, in-
cluding instruments of law. One can use law to mitigate the moral risks
that one assumes.
The real question is when and how the law should facilitate such
mitigation. As a general matter, because moral wrongs and moral respon-
sibility arise in the context of injury to others, moral luck is the wrong-
doer’s counterpart to her victim’s brute luck.44 Thus, because individuals
are responsible for less calamity when calamities are prevented, institu-
tions that mitigate brute bad luck similarly mitigate the moral luck of
those whose actions set in motion the course of events that would other-
wise have ended in calamity. Straightforward reduction of brute luck is
unproblematically morally attractive; the dilemmas relate largely to cost.
But sometimes the attainable alternative to reducing aggregate brute
luck—and corresponding moral risk—is to distribute brute luck more
evenly. For example, the law may reduce the aggregate loss associated
with accidents that cause disability by promoting employment opportuni-
41. See Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 1, at 22–26 (examining whether R
fictionalized Gaugin’s success as artist affects moral character of his earlier act of
abandoning his family).
42. See Nagel, Mortal Questions, supra note 1, at 30–31 (discussing how resultant R
luck determines moral upshot of leaving baby unattended in bath).
43. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing persistent and fundamental R
nature of claim that morality is immune to luck).
44. Cf. John Gardner, Wrongs and Faults, 59 Rev. Metaphysics 95, 107 (2005)
[hereinafter Gardner, Wrongs and Faults] (noting although “[l]awyers are used to
thinking of the person wronged as the main person whose life was made worse by the
wrong,” there is also “moral damage to the life of the wrongdoer”).
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ties and nondiscrimination against disabled persons (thus limiting avoida-
ble waste of human capabilities), but it cannot totally eliminate the eco-
nomic loss associated with some disability. A welfare state that pools the
(substantial) residual economic loss through a broadly funded benefits
program effectively pools the brute luck that each of us may be in a disa-
bling accident. Similarly, it may be undesirable (or prohibitively expen-
sive) to prevent individuals from suffering economic loss as a result of
contracts in which they assume risks that subsequently materialize. But it
may be morally attractive (and possibly economically beneficial, though
that is not of concern here) to limit the severity of those losses through
the tax code and bankruptcy, or the personal consequences of such losses
through the welfare state. Either policy response effectively pools the
brute luck of individuals in contract and thereby mitigates the moral risk
of their contracting partners.
Of course, there are many reasons to pool brute luck. There are rea-
sons of distributive justice and there are humanitarian reasons stemming
from the imperative to reduce suffering and improve the quality of indi-
vidual lives, quite apart from how those lives compare to those of others.
But most institutions can serve more than one function at the same time;
good reasons for pooling brute luck coexist with good reasons for mitigat-
ing moral risk. This Essay’s claim is not that one can explain the existence
of any particular institution by reference to the desire to manage moral
risk, but rather that one can understand some institutions as performing
such a function. Some background social institutions systematically miti-
gate moral risk by pooling brute luck across all residents. One can opt
into and use other institutions, like contract, as a tool with which to man-
age individual moral risk. The centrality of outcomes to the operation of
most legal rules may clash with an ideal of pure moral agency, but it also
makes possible a brand of collective agency that improves the quality of
individual moral lives.
II. CONSENT AND MORAL LUCK
By calling attention to the arbitrary factors that influence moral
standing, moral luck challenges our ordinary moral judgments as well as
certain core beliefs about the nature of morality. It also raises interesting
legal questions, which, until now, have been explored primarily in the
context of either criminal law or tort law.45 In both contexts, the problem
of moral luck potentially complicates the assignment of culpability and
responsibility. In criminal law, the law of attempts is the most immediate
context in which moral luck plays out.46 Scholars differ on whether one
45. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (noting examinations of moral luck R
in torts and criminal law).
46. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm
Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 Rutgers L.J. 725, 733 (1988) (“[T]he
essence of a criminal attempt lies in the defendant’s firm intention to commit the
substantive offense, and the failure to achieve that aim is invariably attributable to factors
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can ultimately justify the imposition of greater punishment for acts that
result in greater harm, as compared to conduct that fails to achieve its
intended harm.47 Moral luck has also provoked considerable discussion
of the nature of responsibility in tort by illuminating our scheme of re-
sponsibility for tortious conduct as extending well beyond the boundaries
of purely voluntary action and its intended consequences.48 In both crim-
inal theory and tort theory, the problem of moral luck has given rise to a
rich literature regarding the nature and grounds for legal liability. By
contrast, there is little scholarly consideration of the relevance of moral
luck to contract.49
Three developments in the relevant literature make it appropriate to
revisit the presumed irrelevance of moral luck to contract. First, the no-
tion of contract as an entirely consensual institution, where all contrac-
tual obligations are fully voluntary in the sense that each party specifically
authorized them, has gradually been uprooted.50 So long as all outcomes
in contract were deemed traceable to consent, misfortune occasioned
such as luck, chance and misjudgment which do not significantly diminish culpability.”);
Lawrence C. Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 262, 276 (1974) (“[T]here is no difficulty in seeing that the killer who fails
because his bullet accidently hits his victim’s belt buckle is no less a social menace in the
requisite sense than one who succeeds because his victim happens to be wearing
suspenders.”); Feinberg, Equal Punishment, supra note 4, at 132 (“I find no intuitive R
plausibility at all in basing criminal liability on moral blameworthiness, thus securing for
one’s position a certain prima facie respectability, but then basing moral blameworthiness
upon, as luck would have it, the actual harm or absence of harm caused.”).
47. Larry Alexander is among those arguing that attempts should be punished
equally. See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 30
(1994) (“[T]he case for the centrality of the culpable act in criminal law is stronger than
the case for taking the causation of harm into consideration, as all criminal codes currently
do.”); Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal
Culpability, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 931, 935 (2000) (“[A]ttempts and successes should be
regarded not only as equally culpable, but also equally blameworthy and punishable . . . .”).
For the argument that punishment appropriately turns on outcome, see Michael Moore,
The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 237,
237–38 (1994); see also R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts 116–27 (1996) (highlighting that
attempts are punished differently from incidents causing relevant harm).
48. See Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes, supra note 31, at 125 (“[T]he tort of R
negligence at common law is morally speaking a variation on the strict liability model of a
tort, in which what is of the essence is what one actually does (injures P), never mind what
one merely tries to do . . . .”); Honoré, supra note 31, at 530 (“[T]o bear the risk of bad R
luck is inherent in the basic form of responsibility in any society . . . .”); Perry, Moral
Foundations, supra note 31, at 506–07 (arguing responsibility as recognized in tort R
encompasses outcome responsibility, not just intended consequences of our acts).
49. See Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, 9 Theoretical Inquiries L. 61, 68 n.9 (2008)
(noting absence of literature on moral luck in contract).
50. See Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 87–103 (1975) (arguing famously for
declining role of consent in contract and related collapse of contract into tort); Richard
Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 99, 129 (2000) (suggesting contract
is no longer seen as special species of purely voluntary obligations); Hanoch Sheinman,
Contractual Liability and Voluntary Undertakings, 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 205, 205–06
(2000) (same); see also Timothy Endicott, Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Incomplete
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through contract could be deemed of limited moral import. Because this
picture no longer prevails, one cannot easily dismiss losses under contract
as entirely self-imposed.
The second development has been the gradual acceptance of out-
come responsibility, or the recognition of a moral responsibility distinct
from culpability or blameworthiness.51 This notion of responsibility was
in some cases developed as a response to the problem of moral luck: It
made it possible to both maintain the centrality of intention to traditional
notions of culpability, and account for moral judgments of actions that
turn on their unintended consequences. The notion of outcome respon-
sibility captures how a party may be morally accountable for harms she
causes through contract even when she cannot be blamed for the con-
duct that gave rise to those harms.
Finally, there is the increased understanding that many of our ex-
planatory analytic concepts are normatively laden. Since at least the time
of Coase’s rabbits and corn, one has not been able to describe a single
actor as having caused an injury.52 Naming the cause of an accident in-
vokes a normative framework that assigns causation to one actor and not
the myriad of other agents and objects, including the victim, that might
also be said to have caused the injury.53 Asserting that a given actor has
imposed or created a risk requires characterizing the agent’s conduct in a
familiar way that makes the probability of harm somewhere between zero
and one.54 But once one conceives of risk creation in this way, it becomes
less intuitive, if not implausible, to identify a particular act or agent as the
single source of a given risk, or as unilaterally having caused a particular
loss. Risks and losses are sometimes the product of joint agency and al-
ways the result of the simultaneous agency of numerous persons who ac-
ted in ways that made any single risk or loss possible. Strictly speaking,
Agreements, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Fourth Series 151, 170–71 (Jeremy Horder
ed., 2000) (defending imposition of obligations parties did not intend to assume).
51. See Honoré, supra note 31, at 530–31 (describing and defending outcome R
responsibility); Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 31, at 72–74 (same); see R
also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral
Luck, 9 Theoretical Inquiries L. 97, 97 (2008) (distinguishing between fault-expressing
and agency-linking responsibility, where outcome responsibility is instance of agency-
linking responsibility).
52. Coase showed that the law may protect one landowner’s right not to have his corn
damaged, or another landowner’s right to allow his rabbits to roam and burrow with the
consequence of destroying corn, but that in the absence of transaction costs, the legal
entitlement would not affect whether the corn was, in fact, destroyed. R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 8, 36 (1960).
53. See Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 McGill L.J. 91,
96 (1996) [hereinafter Coleman & Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune] (highlighting that
determining causation presupposes assignment of obligations, rights, and possible
violations).
54. See Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 31, at 111 (“[T]he imposition R
of risk . . . is not a simple factual state of affairs.”).
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they are the product of collective agency, in that numerous persons acted
in ways that make any single risk or loss possible.
More to the point, when contemplating the private responsibility of
individuals to each other, risks and losses are usually appropriately re-
garded as the work product of at least two individuals.55 A court adjudi-
cating a claim for remedial compensation must assign losses to one party
or the other. But one need not similarly pin underlying responsibility for
outcomes in any transaction, voluntary or involuntary, on one party at the
expense of the other. Highlighting the linguistic and normative choices
built into various apparently descriptive concepts has made it less plausi-
ble to cleanly absolve one party of responsibility merely because one is
comfortable attributing responsibility for the event to another party as
well. If attribution of responsibility to one person does not resolve the
responsibility of other persons, then contractual consent may warrant
withholding remedy for a loss under contract but not absolve the contrac-
tual partner of some responsibility for that loss. Responsibility does not
always find expression in legal liability.
These changes in thinking about contract and responsibility render
consent one factor in a complex calculus of responsibility, rather than a
simple retort to all questions of moral accountability in contract. Before
considering how responsibility in contract survives consent, it is necessary
to better understand why one might think otherwise.
A. The Case Against Moral Luck in Contract
The absence of literature regarding moral luck in contract is not just
historical accident or oversight. It reflects persistent intuitions about con-
tract; namely that there are no moral choices and there is no pure luck.
There is no luck because all uncertainty is accounted for—and risks fairly
assigned—under the expansive umbrella of risk assumption. The uncer-
tainty that arises in the contexts of criminal law and tort law is unplanned
and unaccounted for ex ante. An attempted murder that is fortuitously
thwarted involves unexpected good luck, and an accident caused by an
inadvertent glance away from the road involves unexpected bad luck. In
both cases, the luck appears to have substantial moral consequences. But
an agreement for the sale of a commodity at a fixed price anticipates that
the cost of supplying the good, and the buyer’s interest in obtaining the
good, will rise and fall between the time of contract and performance.
The parties incorporate their expectations about how uncertainty is likely
to play out into their negotiations, and it is reflected in the terms of their
contract, including price. While a party may be unlucky if bad events oc-
cur, whether a contract turns out well or badly for them is not similarly a
matter of luck. The contractual outcome does not depend merely on
events outside the control of either party but also on how the parties
55. Id. at 74 (defending concept of joint risk creation).
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designed their contract. Thus, one might suppose, there is no luck in
contract.
And if there is luck, it is not moral luck. Most crimes are immoral
acts, and so, to the extent luck enters into whether a crime transpires
according to the actor’s wishes, luck is properly characterized as moral
luck. In tort, too, there is a reluctance to give up the understanding of
background involuntary obligations toward others as moral in character,
even if some theories of tort do not presuppose any such moral factor.
But if there is a frontier in the trend toward stripping away legal liability
of any moral ramification, it may be contract, as it is common to regard
contracting as morally uncomplicated.56
Intuitions against the play of moral luck in contract stem from the
perceived work of consent—there can be nothing morally wrong with the
terms on which one contracts because those terms are consented to by
the other party.57 Moreover, parties often consent to a term with poten-
tial negative consequences for themselves in order to obtain a more
favorable term elsewhere in the contract; thus, their consent is hardly
mysterious. This consent is seen to relieve parties of responsibility for any
outcomes associated with the choice of contract terms.58 If consent oper-
ates as the magical fountain of all contractual obligation, then there is no
moral luck and no moral risk in contract.
This Essay argues to the contrary that it is possible (though rare) to
wrong another individual through a voluntary transaction. More often,
parties are morally responsible, in a limited way, for the losses incurred by
those with whom they contract.
It is useful to begin by unpacking the intuition that luck is incompati-
ble with consent. The term luck usually applies when a person, for whom
some positive or negative event occurs, is not responsible for and does
not deserve the good or bad fortune at issue. But when a contract goes
awry for a party, such as when the costs of her performance dramatically
increase or the value of the other party’s performance suddenly drops, a
party’s misfortune is usually clearly traceable to choices she made. In
most cases, she could have insisted on terms that would have shifted the
burden associated with the unexpected development to the other party,
56. See Steven Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability in the Law of Contracts: A
Response to Professor Shiffrin, 58 Drake L. Rev. 177, 193 (2009) (citing cases from several
jurisdictions in which contract law is described variously as “‘amoral,’” “ ‘morally neutral,’”
and unconcerned with “‘the notion of wrong-doing’” (quoting TruGreen Cos. v. Mower
Bros., 199 P.3d 929, 933 (Utah 2008); Ortiz v. Lyon Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66,
75 (Ct. App. 2007); Glendale Fed. Bank v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2001))).
57. Cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1870–1960, at 35
(1992) (noting classical contract theory viewed contract doctrine as “a neutral and
voluntary system in which the judge simply carried out the will of the contracting parties”).
58. Cf. Michael Zimmerman, Moral Luck: A Partial Map, 36 Canadian J. Phil. 585, 607
(2006) (“[L]uck can be a factor in the fulfillment of obligation in a way that it cannot be in
the incurring of responsibility.”).
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albeit at some cost. For example, a subprime mortgagee often chooses to
borrow at a variable rate, assuming the risk that interest rates will rise
dramatically and out of pace with any increase in the value of her home,
rather than pay a fixed but higher interest rate. More generally, a pur-
chaser of goods or services may have the choice of simultaneously
purchasing insurance against certain known risks. In some cases, the
probability of the risked misfortune materializing is so low that it renders
any such precaution irrational ex ante. But the fact that alternative terms
were available at the time of contract appears to render an unfortunate
course of events a manifestation of bad choice rather than bad luck. If,
even with hindsight, contractual design is not to blame, the party suffer-
ing misfortune under contract might have avoided or mitigated negative
results by exercising other precautions, such as limiting reliance, purchas-
ing insurance, or entering into other contracts that would have shifted
certain risks to others.
The end result is that when contracts go wrong, we may feel sorry for
the party who bears an increased burden, but we are inclined to trace
those burdens back to choices she made. Her responsibility does not de-
rive merely from a broad sense of personal agency; it is classic responsibil-
ity for consciously made choices. It is not what is commonly regarded as
luck.
Another account might accept the phenomenon as luck, but regard
it as luck of a variety that is not morally concerning: option luck. Ronald
Dworkin’s concept of option luck refers to luck that determines how a
gamble materializes.59 If a person chooses to enter an agreement by
which she will either pay or win fifty dollars depending on whether she
wins a coin toss, she faces option luck. By contrast, brute luck arises where
the individual did not choose to subject herself to the particular constel-
lation of outcomes she faces.60 In instances of brute luck, the unlucky
cannot be said to have brought their misfortune upon themselves. In
cases of option luck, the reality of misfortune seems offset, from a moral
point of view, by the unactualized possibility of good fortune. Luck egal-
itarians often rely on Dworkin’s distinction to identify the kind of luck
they seek to neutralize.61 It may be morally appealing to use social policy
to dissipate brute luck to the greatest extent possible—but rarely do we
seek to neutralize option luck. Option luck seems critical to personal re-
sponsibility; it captures the typical exercise of choice with attendant con-
sequence.62 If those who suffer losses in contract are victims of mere op-
59. Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 283, 293 (1981).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Avraham & Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 3, at 184 (using option luck/ R
brute luck distinction to identify morally problematic luck).
62. Gambling represents the purest example of option luck. If two people who are
identically situated choose to bet a fixed amount on a coin toss, few have the intuition that
awarding that amount to the winner is unfair.
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tion luck, then their losses are not properly understood as harm for
which the other party could bear responsibility. In that case, the other
party is not subject to moral luck.
Dismissal of moral luck in contract for reasons along these lines is
misguided. While it is true that gambles generate option luck and no
corresponding moral risk, moral risk is the counterpart to brute luck
where the events that subject one individual to brute luck are the product
of another individual’s agency. Both option luck and brute luck are pre-
sent in the course of a normal contract because the initial terms of a
contract are never so freely chosen as to eliminate the role of brute luck.
One chooses contract terms from a limited and uncertain set of options,
each of which is imperfectly cognized, and the preferences one brings to
bear on that choice reflect the burdens of circumstance. Contract terms,
however, are enough of a function of joint agency as to render both par-
ties responsible for subsequent outcomes as experienced by either party.
The argument that consent to contract does not eliminate moral risk thus
amounts to three claims, related to the three theoretical developments
suggested above: (1) brute luck is present in contract, such that negative
outcomes in contract cannot be dismissed as entirely reducible to the
choices of that party; (2) notwithstanding consent, individuals are some-
times culpable for the losses their contractual partners sustain; and (3)
more often, both parties to a contract are responsible for outcomes gen-
erated by their agreement, including outcomes for the other party.
B. Brute Luck in Contract
Modern contract theory emphasizes the extent to which much of
contract design does not reflect affirmative choice on the part of one or
even both parties to a contract. The famous but exaggerated collapse of
contract into tort (“the death of contract”) refers to a lifting of the veil:
Contractual obligations are not fully voluntary.63
Economic theories of contract help distill the arbitrary elements in
the origin of any contract. Segmented markets and information costs
limit the number of potential contracting partners that any one person
can consider,64 limiting the choosing element in the choice of contrac-
tual partner. Once contract partners are paired, the obligations they each
assume are not usually entirely traceable to choice either. Cognitive limi-
tations make it difficult, if not impossible, for parties to correctly gauge
the probability of future events.65 To the extent that they simply fail to
register certain potential contingencies, the parties’ allocation of risk re-
63. See Gilmore, supra note 50, at 95–103 (arguing for “death of contract” as it R
collapses into tort).
64. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 75 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing
identification costs as obstacle to efficient contract).
65. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 211, 213–25 (1995) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition] (discussing
limits on rational decisionmaking when faced with uncertainty).
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lated to those events is not conscious at all; it may reflect default rules
that are sometimes motivated by courts’ best guesses as to what parties are
expected to prefer—hypothetical preferences that are importantly differ-
ent from actual choices.66 Sometimes default rules are motivated by inde-
pendent public policy considerations,67 and are thus even further re-
moved from the choices of the contracting parties. To the extent the
contract does actively allocate risks, lack of information and cognitive lim-
itations under uncertainty may render the choice to handle these contin-
gencies in one way rather than another something short of “free.”68
Transaction costs—including the cost of identifying contingencies
that could arise, the cost of understanding each party’s preferred method
of handling those contingencies and determining the efficient way of al-
locating related risk, as well as the cost of drafting a contract that reflects
these design choices—make it prohibitively expensive to completely
transform brute luck into option luck by means of contract design.69 For
many parties, their market position (or the market itself) does not permit
a choice of terms.70 All told, modern contract theory emphasizes the de-
66. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gerner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 90 (1989) (describing existing
academic view that defaults represent terms parties would have negotiated).
67. Id. at 93–94 (noting penalty defaults may be used to motivate parties to supply
terms where they are more efficiently supplied ex ante than by court ex post, and in order
to motivate parties to reveal information they strategically withheld in order to obtain
greater proportion of transactional surplus).
68. See Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition, supra note 65, at 213, 224–25 (explaining R
limits on cognition and risk assessment).
69. See Shavell, Damage Measures, supra note 7, at 468 (“[I]t may be less costly in the R
expected sense for the parties to resolve difficulties only on the chance that they arise than
to bear with certainty the costs of providing for the contingency in the contract.”).
70. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 446 (2002) (“[T]he terms included in standard-form
contracts tend to be uniform within an industry . . . .”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203,
1263 (2003) (citing several cases in which courts recognized that most employees have no
choice but to accept odious arbitration clauses); Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of
Law: A Fragment, 94 Yale L.J. 1855, 1931 (1985) (indicating that certain form contracts are
“used by all members of a particular industry such that a consumer could not acquire
certain goods or services at all except on a particular set of terms”); Shelley Smith,
Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1035, 1040 (2010) (“Residential mortgages have been
classified as contracts of adhesion because their terms are selected by professional lenders
for unsophisticated borrowers who have no choice but to accept the lenders’ terms or
forego purchasing their home.”).
This characterization of the lack of choice in these instances is not so much factual as
normative. There is always some literal sense in which each party has a choice to reject
proposed terms. What is implied when this Essay argues that choices were not freely
chosen is that the party in question should not be held fully or solely responsible for their
consequences. This point is analogous to that made by John Rawls with respect to market
outcomes for individuals more generally. Rawls observed that whatever one’s talents, one’s
remunerative value turns on the state of the world in which one finds oneself. John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice 72 (1971) (“The existing distribution of income and wealth . . . is the
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gree to which the scope of contractual obligation under a given agree-
ment is only partly a function of each party’s free choices.71 Contractual
obligation is not limited to voluntary obligation, and the unexpected
good fortune and misfortune that arises in the course of contract cannot
be reduced to option luck alone.
C. The Possibility of Culpability for the Losses of a Consenting Party
Background conditions may render the terms on which any two par-
ties will contract predictable to outsiders. But in reality terms vary.
Though they may be struck under strikingly similar conditions, they are
only imperfectly predictable.72 This reflects the fact that, for at least one
contracting partner, there is a moment of ex ante choice as to the terms
he will exact from his partner. One might argue that this choice, with its
uncertain consequences for both parties, is not a moment of moral risk
because, whatever may befall the weaker party under the contract, that
party consents to assume that material risk.
While public policy may provide abundant reason to treat the
choices of others to enter into contract as entirely free (in the usual
case), this is not the correct vantage point from which to judge one
party’s decision to contract on terms highly unfavorable to the other
party.73 The bare exercise of choice, like the taint of brute luck, is omni-
cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural assets . . . and their use favored or disfavored
over time by social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and good
fortune.” (emphasis added)). It is mere luck (though not accident) that one finds oneself
in an economy that rewards those with a talent for banking acumen more handsomely
than one with a knack for resolving the mysteries of plumbing. Similarly, it is morally
arbitrary that one’s contractual options are what they are. If misfortune befalls someone
who choses not to purchase protection in the contract under which that misfortune arose,
it was partly that person’s choice, but partly the luck-saturated market within which that
person exercised the choice that caused the negative outcome. To the extent contractual
behavior reflects morally arbitrary features of our environment, transactional conduct—
like the market outcomes it generates over time—cannot be taken as self-justifying on
grounds of free choice.
71. David Enoch and Andrei Marmor argue that the idea of luck is “not relative to
some initial assessment of probabilities.” Enoch & Marmor, supra note 2, at 407. This R
might be taken to imply that the difficulty of assessing risks at the time of contract does not
bear on the presence of luck. Technically, this is true. However, where the assumption of
risk is taken to wash away the moral significance of uncertainties that would otherwise
clearly qualify as matters of luck, the difficulty in assessing risk is relevant to whether
assumption of risk in fact has that normative effect. See also supra note 50 and R
accompanying text (describing developing consensus that contract is not fully voluntary).
72. This is not a metaphysical claim—whether the unpredictability is ultimately
traceable to the bare exercise of free will or just imperfect information about relevant
circumstantial facts is not important here.
73. This point is analogous to the objections raised against John Rawls’s theory of
justice. A number of critics contend that the argument justifying inequalities as necessary
to incentivize the talented to productively employ their talents fails because it puts the
talented themselves in the morally indefensible position of taking their own talents
hostage. See generally Joseph H. Carens, Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market 2,
200–08 (1981) (discussing possibility and scope of social duty to contribute talents for
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present and cannot be used either to assign or deny responsibility for
particular outcomes.74 The state has good reasons to empower individu-
als to enter binding agreements without inquiry into the quality of con-
sent and to hold individuals accountable for their commitments, but
those reasons do not necessarily apply to other individuals. The state
must take the probable behavior of individuals as a given, while an indi-
vidual contracting party may decide what to do. In its choice of a legal
rule, the state must expect to influence the behavior of future contracting
parties; most private individuals cannot rationally expect their individual
acts to meaningfully affect the behavior of future parties. Thus, the state
can achieve outcomes that individuals cannot, and vice versa. The state
also has reasons for acting or not acting that stem from its particular man-
date and the boundaries of legitimate state action. In this way, the state is
subject to moral reasons that do not apply to individuals, even as individu-
als are subject to agent-relative considerations that do not apply to the
state. It is not surprising that the threshold for, and implications of, con-
sent should differ in the reasoning of private and state actors.
Courts have both principled and pragmatic reasons to narrowly cir-
cumscribe inquiries into the quality of contractual consent. The state’s
attitude toward each individual, including its presumptions about his or
her capacity to deliberate and exercise choice, may be important to legiti-
mating state authority.75 Because the state plays an important role in
shaping public culture and our understanding as to the conditions under
collective gain); Joseph H. Carens, Rights and Duties in an Egalitarian Society, 14 Pol.
Theory 31, 35–36 (1986) (revising maximalist version of social duty to require only that
individuals make good use of their talents); G.A. Cohen, Incentives, Inequality, and
Community, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 263, 268–69 (G.B. Petersen ed.,
1992) (noting talented people “would not need special incentives if they were themselves
unambivalently committed to the [difference] principle”); G.A. Cohen, The Pareto
Argument for Inequality, 12 Soc. Phil. & Pol. 160, 172–73 (1995) (rejecting as inconsistent
Rawls’ argument that notwithstanding prima facie commitment to equal outcomes we
should prefer unequal state where it is possible to improve situation of talented individuals
without injuring others); G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive
Justice, 26 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 8–9 (1997) [hereinafter Cohen, Where the Action Is]
(“[T]he difference principle can justify inequality only in a society where not everyone
accepts that very principle.”). While a third party, like the state, may have to take the
actions of talented persons (in the context of justifying inequality) or potential breachers
(in the context of contract law) as given, the talented and the would-be breachers cannot
themselves cite a lack of material incentive as justification for otherwise immoral conduct.
But see Andrew Williams, Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity, 27 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 225,
226–27 (1998) (arguing against Cohen’s critique of Rawls’s defense of inequality-
generating incentives).
74. See Coleman & Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, supra note 53, at 123 R
(“[O]ption luck seems to be everywhere and so provides no way of deciding to whom
particular misfortunes belong.”).
75. See Aditi Bagchi, Intention, Torture, and the Concept of State Crime, 114 Penn
St. L. Rev. 1, 22–26 (discussing conditions for rational belief in duty of obedience to
legitimate state authority). That article argued that the legitimacy of the state depends on
it being possible for individual citizens to view the state as acting on their behalf, such that
they have reasons (other than fear) to defer to political authority. Individuals cannot view
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which we are bound by what we or others have said or done, courts may
be reluctant to chip away at the strong presumption that contractual
promises are morally binding by sometimes denying them legal effect.76
Courts are also aware that denying the power of contractual consent to
certain groups may actually diminish the welfare of those groups by cut-
ting them off from a range of goods and services.77 It may also often
simply be cheaper and more effective for the state not to inquire into the
status and prospects of contracting parties and to instead use other
means to advance welfare and distributive ends. Finally, a party contem-
plating particular terms or whether to breach has information pertaining
to her own situation, and possibly that of the other party, that the state
does not. She may also have the capability to effectuate a range of out-
comes that the state lacks the wherewithal to bring about.78 The norma-
tive consequences of these differences in information and capacity are
that the state may justify its rules and policies toward contracting parties
on grounds that are not available to individual contracting parties at-
tempting to justify their actions to one another.79
Many of the normative and pragmatic reasons the state may have to
treat consent as dispositive with respect to the legal claims available to a
person do not extend to individuals considering the scope of their moral
responsibility in contract. Consent may obligate or constrain the state,
but consent to our actions by another party does not obligate us to do
whatever it is to which they consent. It is mere permission.80 We can im-
agine a range of acts to which others may consent which we would never-
theless deem wrongful. An imprudent person may offer to lend me her
car, but if I know that she needs it as much or more than I do, it would be
wrong to take it from her. A generous person may invite you to stay in her
second apartment as an extended guest, but if you know she needs the
rental income it would be wrong to knowingly worsen her financial situa-
the state in this way if it conducts itself on the apparent presumption that those individuals
lack the capacity to deliberate and exercise choice. Id.
76. See Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 916, 933–38
(1982) (suggesting contract law supports moral practice of promise).
77. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
(arguing poor man may be “worse off by a rule of nonenforcement of hard bargains”).
78. Cf. Cohen, Where the Action Is, supra note 73, at 6–10 (arguing that Rawls’s R
defense of distributive inequities as necessary to motivate talented individuals to employ
their talents productively is not available to those very individuals when they demand high
compensation for something they could choose to do without).
79. The prospect of interpersonal (or intersubjective) justification grounds many
contemporary theories of morality. See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other
153 (1998) (characterizing right actions as ones that we can justify to others on grounds
they could not reasonably reject); Korsgaard, Reflection, supra note 15, at 136 (describing R
right actions as reflecting reasons we can share).
80. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 Legal Theory 121, 123 (1996)
(“[C]onsent can generate a permission that allows another to do a wrong act. When
consent operates in this . . . manner, it does not morally transform a wrong act into a right
act . . . .”).
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tion. Permission cannot prevent culpability. We can wrong a person even
when she has consented to it.81
Consent may justify the absence of any legal remedy for the infliction
of harm but it may not justify that infliction of harm as an individual act,
which may still be appropriately regarded as blameworthy. The reasons
that apply to the state’s decision as to whether to offer a remedy differ
from those that apply to the prospective wrongdoer. Again, the reasons
that apply to a promisor are prototypically agent-relative; they are reasons
that apply specifically to the promisor to fulfill obligations she has created
specifically to the promisee.82
Not every contract term that subsequently results in loss to one of the
parties is appropriately regarded as a wrong inflicted by the other. If a
business purchases fire insurance and the insurance company subse-
quently incurs a substantial loss as a result of the obligation to pay out on
that policy, the business cannot be understood to have wronged the in-
surance company. But the implausibility of that result should not stand in
the way of a more limited claim. If the choice of a particular contract
term is otherwise properly regarded as blameworthy—for example, be-
cause it exploits and exacerbates background injustice—then the bare
fact of consent does not relieve blame from the party that extracted it.
The state may have good reasons for enforcing (and recognizing as con-
sensual) contracts in which retailers have sold items like flashlights or
bottled water at prices far above their usual cost during a temporary sup-
ply shortage. But individual retailers may still have reason not to charge
some customers the prices they are entitled to charge to all customers,
where the higher prices are not necessary to recoup their own costs and
will result in foreseeable harm either to those who must spend a substan-
tial portion of their resources to acquire the items or to those who will
forego them as a result of the higher prices.
As a general matter, losses under a contract say little about the culpa-
bility of the parties. And in the vast majority of contracting scenarios
81. For an account of when a choice of terms might amount to a culpable wrong, see
infra Part III.A.
82. See Philip Pettit & Robert Goodin, The Possibility of Special Duties, 16 Canadian
J. Phil. 651, 653 (1986) (“[A]n agent has special duties towards those to whom he has
implicitly or explicitly made certain commitments. These are obligations to fulfill those
commitments, even though the general welfare might be improved far more by ignoring
them.”); Douglas W. Portmore, McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-
Neutral Distinction, 13 Utilitas 350, 350 (2001) (using example of promise as creating
agent-relative reasons for promisor). Agent-relative reasons may permit agents to do
something that will not lead to the best results over all, or they may require it. See Thomas
Nagel, The View from Nowhere 175 (1986) (“An individual is permitted to favor himself
with respect to an interest to the degree to which the agent-relative reason generated by
that interest exceeds the corresponding agent-neutral reason.”); Shelly Kagan, The
Structure of Normative Ethics, 6 Phil. Persp. 223, 231–32 (1992) (discussing agent-relative
permission as factor relevant to determining moral status of act); see also Philip Pettit,
Universalizability Without Utilitarianism, 96 Mind 74, 75 (1987) (defining agent-relative
reasons).
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there may be little moral constraint on the terms which one party may
negotiate with another (at least with respect to losses that the agreement
may generate for those two parties). But to the extent that contracting
behavior is otherwise culpable, as Part III argues it sometimes is, the bare
fact of consent by the other party does not wipe the slate clean.
D. Shared Responsibility for Losses in the Course of Contract
Most contracts that end up badly for one party do not amount to a
wrong by the other. One can wrong another person through a consensual
transaction: The fact of their consent is in part a function of facts beyond
their control, and in some cases, those facts represent an injustice, the
exploitation of which constitutes a wrong. This Essay has argued thus far
that consent to contract does not absolve one party of blame for an other-
wise blameworthy act. But only some transactions are wrongful in this
sense. More frequently, the choice of terms can be treated as an exercise
in joint agency (even in the absence of bargaining), and agents are jointly
responsible for the losses that result from their joint actions with others,
including actions of exchange. The fact that the person to whom one
agent is responsible is a joint author of the action that resulted in her loss
does not immunize her. The agency of one party more generally does not
immunize the other.
Consider a joint business venture governed by contract. Two individ-
uals each commit to contribute $20,000 per year for five years, with pay-
ment at fixed dates, in order to capitalize the business. Liquidated dam-
ages specify the consequences for late payment. Should the financial
circumstances of one party change such that she must take out loans at
high interest rates in order to meet her contractual obligations, and
should this debt subsequently drive her into personal bankruptcy, her
business partner shares responsibility for this misfortune. Her partner is
not liable and may not owe her anything in particular. And clearly the
now bankrupt party is herself responsible for her own circumstances. But
a thin responsibility, outcome responsibility, is shared with the contrac-
tual partner who helped engineer the obligations that ultimately led to
financial ruin. The business partner exercised control over the events
that precipitated misfortune for the other, and the terms of their agree-
ment led predictably (though not probably) to that misfortune. He is re-
sponsible for the misfortune he had the capacity to avoid.
For those reluctant to espouse hypothetical responsibility on these
facts, consider a parallel tale. Two individuals each commit to contribute
$20,000 per year for five years, with payment at fixed dates, in order to
capitalize the business. At an early stage of the venture, one partner exits
on mutually agreed terms. In later years, the business becomes fabulously
profitable and the remaining partner is very wealthy and respected as a
result. Would the partner who left the venture feel some responsibility for
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the remaining partner’s success? Anecdotal evidence suggests he would.83
Responsibility is sometimes an occasion for pride and at other times occa-
sion for regret or shame. It tends to be more eagerly claimed in the for-
mer case, but it attaches with equal liberality in the case of both positive
and negative outcomes.
Each party to a contract may be in the best position to protect itself
against potential loss in various ways, whether by decreasing reliance or
through the purchase of insurance. But precautions against loss by anony-
mous wrongdoers is available in the context of tort law, and to a lesser
extent even in criminal law. Tort claims no longer fail on grounds of
contributory negligence in most jurisdictions.84 While liability is reduced
in proportion to comparative negligence,85 unlike the monetary damages
sought in a civil case, responsibility for a loss is not of a fixed quantum
that needs to be distributed between victim and wrongdoer such that any
contributorily irresponsible conduct by the victim would proportionally
reduce responsibility of the wrongdoer. This may be one of the ways in
which legal and moral responsibility diverge.86 For example, where one
person grossly deceives another, legal responsibility for the misrepresen-
tation might be reduced if most people would recognize the fraud on its
face. However, moral responsibility for the fraud would not be amelio-
rated because the fraud was so obvious and outrageous that the de-
frauded person should have recognized it too.
The idea that legal responsibility for a loss must be assigned to one
individual or another, while moral responsibility may be shared, is not
surprising in light of more obvious asymmetries between legal and moral
responsibility. The question of liability itself is binary87—either a defen-
dant is liable or not—while moral responsibility intuitively rests along a
83. See Steve Lohr, An ‘Unvarnished’ Peek into Microsoft’s History, N.Y. Times, Apr.
18, 2011, at B3 (describing Paul Allen’s view of central role he played in early years of
Microsoft and his relationship with Bill Gates).
84. See Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative:
Which Is the Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 41, 44–45 (2003) (describing
how doctrine barring recovery in cases of contributory negligence has been repealed in
almost all states).
85. Comparative negligence usually requires each party to pay his or her proportion
of the damages. Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (N.M. 1981) (“Pure comparative
negligence . . . holds all parties fully responsible for their own respective acts to the degree
that those acts have caused harm.”).
86. See Pettit & Goodin, supra note 82, at 666 (presenting criteria for allocation of R
responsibility which permits assignment of responsibility to agent where multiple agents
may exercise simultaneous control over outcomes); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The
Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708, 724 (2007) (noting duty to
mitigate in legal institution of contract is point of divergence from moral practice of
promise).
87. Even in cases of comparative negligence, the legal liability of the parties is
reduced to reflect the liability of the others. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 897 (Ill.
1981) (“In a suit under a ‘pure’ form of comparative negligence in which the defendant
counterclaims for his own damages, each party must bear the burden of the percentage of
damages of all parties in direct proportion to his fault.”).
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spectrum. We cannot treat legal responsibility as other than binary be-
cause a range of remedies is available, since the scope of remedy reflects
the magnitude of what an individual is responsible for, not how responsi-
ble she is for it in light of all the other agents that might be implicated.
Legal and moral responsibilities diverge in other ways. The absence
of legal liability for one individual does not comment on the affirmative
legal liability of any other individual. By contrast, denying the moral re-
sponsibility of one individual for an outcome that was under human con-
trol often does reflect on the moral responsibility of someone else.88 In
any given case, legal liability diverges from moral responsibility for a num-
ber of reasons—institutional, pragmatic, evidentiary—that have nothing
to do with whether other agents might be responsible. There should be
no expectation that they should track each other with respect to the ques-
tion of apportionment of responsibility.
One might nevertheless resist the idea of shared responsibility for
contractual outcomes as inconsistent with the absence of a remedial duty
where one fully performs under a contract which nevertheless results in
loss for the other party. The law recognizes no such remedial duty and
one would not normally regard someone as morally obligated to remedy
losses they have not caused through breach. The plausibility of responsi-
bility in light of this objection ultimately rests on the possibility of respon-
sibility in the absence of remedial obligation more generally. The original
notion of outcome responsibility certainly accounted for such a possibil-
ity. Stephen Perry expressly argued that outcome responsibility “does not
normally give rise by itself to a moral obligation to compensate, although
by normatively linking an agent to a harmful outcome it serves as a basis
for such an obligation.”89
Outcome responsibility generally is more detached from obligation
than the deeper sense of responsibility reflected in notions of culpability
or blame. Culpability or blame attaches upon breach of a moral obliga-
tion. But one can be responsible for outcomes that could have been pre-
vented though one had no moral obligation to prevent them ex ante.
Similarly, one can be responsible for an outcome though one has no
moral obligation to cure harm ex post. As Perry suggests, the extension of
outcome responsibility outside of obligation is consistent with the motiva-
tion behind the concept in both his and Tony Honoré’s accounts, that is,
to give agency meaning.90 Agency is exercised, and responsibility created,
through a range of actions that are neither obligatory nor in breach of
obligation.
88. For example, in situations where we assume that a risk warrants some preventive
measure, the conclusion that one person could not have been expected to prevent the
accident may suggest that another individual ought to have taken steps to prevent the
accident.
89. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 31, at 73. R
90. Id.; see supra note 31 (discussing key articles laying out concept of outcome R
responsibility).
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The agency of one contracting party, evident in her consent to con-
tract terms and her ability to attenuate potential losses arising under the
contract, does not undo either the agency of the other party or the other
party’s corresponding responsibility for losses suffered by the first. This
potential responsibility may not find expression in legal liability, in which
case there is no legal risk. Nor need it give rise to a remedial duty, though
in some cases it may. If a party engineers a transaction that harms her
contractual partner, she shares responsibility for her partner’s loss just as
she would share responsibility were she to participate in some other inno-
cent act that resulted in injury. Her partner’s consent to the transaction
has normative significance along many dimensions, but it does not elimi-
nate the risk of moral responsibility.
III. MORAL RISK TAKING IN CONTRACT
While contract has been overlooked in discussions of moral luck in
law,91 contract is particularly illuminating once one focuses on the con-
scious navigation of moral luck, and not just on its background presence
as a factor in the assessment of all human action. Moral luck is present in
the course of contract, as it is over the course of injurious acts we call
torts, or in the course of committing a crime. But contract highlights that
moral luck does not always fall upon us unanticipated. It mediates be-
tween our conscious choices and the moral salience of our acts in the way
that market unpredictability mediates between our choices and our
wealth. While market uncertainty indicates uncertainty as to market out-
comes, the fact of market uncertainty is well known and accounted for,
hence the assumption of market risk. Similarly, moral risk is assumed in
ordinary acts, among which are the execution and performance of
contracts.
Moral luck enters contract at two stages: contract formation (ex
ante) and contract performance (ex post). In the making of agreements,
luck affects the moral valence of the choice to contract on certain terms.
This Part suggests four ways that the choice of contract terms can be un-
derstood as fraught with moral risk. It then turns to the ways in which
luck operates on the choices presented in the course of performance. In
the keeping of agreements, too, luck may determine how well or poorly
parties treat their contracting partners.
A. Moral Luck in Contract Formation
Moral luck at the stage of contract formation turns on whether the
terms one negotiates with (or imposes on) one’s contracting partner turn
out to have been morally acceptable or morally dubious. In principle, of
course, one might think that the moral significance of those terms is no
less determinate ex ante than their rationality from a self-interested point
91. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing dearth of literature on R
moral luck in contract law).
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of view. One does not say that parties were irrational for taking bets that
turn out badly for themselves where those bets were justified by the odds
perceptible at the time they were made. Similarly, one might reason, we
should not blame individuals for contract terms that end up very badly
for the other party, unless the terms were so obviously and inevitably inju-
rious that the alleged victim herself would have rejected them. The asym-
metry arises because the rationality of an act depends on only informa-
tion available at the time the decision was made, while, if we take moral
luck as our premise, the morality of an act turns on outcomes unknown at
the time the act is undertaken. Thus, it is possible for terms to be defini-
tively rational or irrational notwithstanding uncertain consequences from
the perspective of a given contracting agent, but of uncertain moral im-
port because of its uncertain consequences for the other party.
The presence of moral risk at the ex ante stage of contract will never-
theless strike some as unintuitive on the grounds that contractual terms
are agreed upon (largely) in the absence of particularized background
duties. If we have no obligation to look out for the economic interests of
those with whom we contract, why should one be constrained in our ne-
gotiation of mutually agreed-upon terms? General objections against the
moral valence of contracting that center on the role of consent by the
other party were addressed separately in Part II. This Part lays out affirma-
tively the kinds of wrongs that one might commit, or the kinds of moral
responsibility one might incur, through choice of contract terms. It sug-
gests four distinct ways, sometimes overlapping and sometimes incompati-
ble, in which one might understand the choice of terms to involve moral
risk. The argument does not turn on the merits of any one of these pic-
tures of contracting, nor, really, does it require the success of any. There
may be other accounts of how morality enters choice of contract terms.
The argument here requires only that the reader perceive some moral
risk present in the choice of terms, and that moral risk for one con-
tracting party be ameliorated by institutions that prevent the most disas-
trous outcomes for the other party. Finally, it is worth noting that this
Essay’s claims in connection with contract formation are nicely symmetri-
cal with, but ultimately separable from, its claims regarding moral risk in
contract performance.
1. Background Distributive Claims in Contract. — That contract terms
can be immoral should be less controversial than the claim that contract
terms represent moral choices. After all, established doctrines like uncon-
scionability refer to substantive unconscionability, which effectively labels
the terms of a contract immoral.92 But the claim that a contract can be
92. See, e.g., Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.) 100, 2 Ves.
Sen. 125, 155 (defining unconscionable agreement as one that “no man in his senses and
not under delusion could make on the one hand, and no honest and fair man would
accept on the other; which are unequitable and unconscientious bargains; and of such
even the common law has taken notice”); see also Zoneff v Elcom Credit Union Ltd.
(1990) 94 ALR 445, 463 (Austl.) (“[C]onduct will be unconscionable where the conduct
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immoral implies that the choice of terms is always a moral one. Because
while a legal rule such as unconscionability may be binary in its applica-
tion, it is implausible that the moral condition it tracks is similarly bi-
nary.93 We can find a term more shocking than another though neither
reaches the threshold for substantive unconscionability.94 Similarly we
can find one term more outrageous than another though both are so
exploitive as to be unenforceable.95
Thus, while a term may be substantively unconscionable or not be-
cause its moral flaws either hit a requisite threshold or do not, the moral
flaws themselves fall along a spectrum. We can use the legal concept of
substantive unconscionability to locate the relevant moral intuition with-
out carrying over the binary property of the rule to the moral dimension
of contract terms.
What exactly makes a term unconscionable or immoral? I have ar-
gued elsewhere that terms that exploit and exacerbate background dis-
tributive injustice breach background imperfect duties we each have to-
ward others and should be regarded as unconscionable.96 Distributive
justice is a property of social institutions, and while collective institutions
may be the best mechanisms by which to realize distributive justice, where
background institutions fail to achieve distributive justice, residual rights
can be seen in accordance with the ordinary concepts of mankind to be so against
conscience that a court should intervene”); Harry v. Kreutziger (1978), 95 D.L.R. 3d 231,
241 (Can. B.C. C.A.) (finding conduct unconscionable where “sufficiently divergent from
community standards of commercial morality”).
93. This Essay is not making a general claim that moral conditions are never binary,
only that unconscionable terms are not equally unconscionable and terms which do not
rise to the level of unconscionability are not equally meritorious from a moral standpoint.
The concept of a “hard case” illustrates the point.
94. Cf. Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd (2002)
117 FCR 301, 320 (Austl.) (finding behavior must be “toward the extreme end of the scale”
to be unconscionable).
95. For example, we may find an arbitration clause in a computer purchase
agreement that does not rise to the level of an adhesive contract substantively
unconscionable and unenforceable. E.g., Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215,
1217–22 (N.M. 2008) (finding class action prohibition in contract unconscionable). But,
we may find an arbitration clause in an employment contract that waives judicial remedy
for violations of civil rights laws even more unconscionable when it is both substantively
oppressive and adhesive. E.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d
669, 689–99 (Cal. 2000) (“‘[E]ssentially a sliding scale is invoked’ . . . . [T]he more
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required.” (quoting 15 Walter H.E. Jaeger, Wililston on Contracts
§ 1763A, at 226–27 (3d ed. 1972))).
96. See Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 Hastings L.J. 105, 135
(2008) [hereinafter Bagchi, Distributive Injustice] (arguing for existence of background
imperfect duties between private citizens); cf. Jules Coleman, The Mixed Conception of
Corrective Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 427, 432 (1992) [hereinafter Coleman, Mixed
Conception] (noting distributive justice “requires a certain state of the world be brought
about, but no one in particular has a special reason in justice for bringing it about,” i.e.,
distributive justice does not give rise to any perfect duties).
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and duties flow directly between individuals.97 Those residual duties are
not like most duties expressed in private law; they are positive and imper-
fect, in that individuals have a general duty toward many individuals who
meet certain socioeconomic criteria but no specific duty to perform any
particular acts toward, or for the benefit of, any particular other individ-
ual.98 But those imperfect positive duties give rise to more limited nega-
tive duties which do find expression in law.99
The upshot of that discussion is that we do have background duties
toward other individuals in our society and those duties constrain the
terms on which we may transact. The idea is not that we have to aim
toward distributive justice through our contracting, but that we may not
exploit and exacerbate distributive injustice.100 Such a principle does not
arbitrarily burden defendants in civil suits that may be favored by the
prevailing maldistribution of resources because the constraints apply uni-
versally; it does not allocate or shift the burdens of redistribution.101 Nor
does the principle require more of any contracting party as a result of
other citizens’ noncompliance with their duties to support distributive
justice through ordinary politics. Were compliance universal, there would
be no opportunity for the kind of exploitation the principle precludes.102
Nevertheless, the principle does constrain contracting behavior and
can help identify blameworthy choices with respect to contract terms. For
example, imagine a labor market in which widget polishers require three
weeks of employer-specific training, the prevailing wage is $12 per hour,
standard paid sick leave is ten days per year, and health insurance bene-
97. See Bagchi, Distributive Injustice, supra note 96, at 131–35 (“[W]here the state R
has not achieved distributive justice, individuals have imperfect social duties and rights.”).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 117.
101. For the argument that taking matters of distributive justice into account in
private law arbitrarily burdens wealthy defendants who happen to injure poor plaintiffs, see
Coleman & Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, supra note 53, at 93 (“The duties imposed R
by distributive justice are . . . agent-general—everyone has a duty to create and sustain just
distributions.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in The Theory of Contract
Law: New Essays 206, 257–58 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) (considering rules for contracts
between parties of disparate wealth); Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between
Corrective and Distributive Justice, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, supra note 50, at R
237, 238–39 (comparing corrective and distributive justice); see also Eric A. Posner,
Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury
Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 283, 284
(1995) (offering defense of unconscionability doctrine that does not turn on its
distributive effects, in light of various objections raised against distributive defenses of
unconscionability, including charge of arbitrariness).
102. For this reason, the principle prohibiting exploitation or exacerbation of
distributive injustice is compliant with Liam Murphy’s “Compliance Condition,” should the
suggested principle fall within the domain of the latter condition. Liam B. Murphy, The
Demands of Beneficence, 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 267, 278 (1993) (“[A] principle of
beneficence should not increase its demands on agents as expected compliance with the
principle by other agents decreases.”).
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fits are available only after six months. Employers are unable to differenti-
ate workers within a wide range and prospective employees on the labor
market are unable to distinguish employers except with respect to the
hourly rate and sick leave policy. The market is sufficiently small that, at
any given time, usually only one employer is hiring; new positions be-
come available only once every several months. One employer offers an
employee $10 per hour and allows five paid sick days per year, knowing
that it will not be possible for the employee to pursue or hold out for a
better option and that she cannot afford to purchase private insurance
for six months in order to switch employers at a later date. If the back-
ground state of affairs that frames the employee’s preferences and capaci-
ties are unjust, then the employer unduly exploits those facts to his advan-
tage. If the market would consolidate in the employer’s absence such that
the other firms would likely employ the workers which this employer now
employs, the employer may be worsening the economic position of the
prospective employee. The resulting contract should be enforced, but the
employer can be blamed for its terms, and in particular, for his departure
from market norms. Should the low wages or limited sick leave turn out
to have especially grave consequences for a particular employee due to
personal but not wholly idiosyncratic characteristics, the employer will be
more blameworthy because his conduct has given rise to greater (foresee-
able) harm.
Even if one is persuaded that a party’s choice of contract terms is
constrained in light of the background injustice which it exploits and ex-
acerbates, the reality is that in our ordinary experience of contract, we
rarely pause to contemplate the distributive consequences of our agree-
ments. There are exceptions, as where the disparity between our own situ-
ation and that of an individual employee or employer is especially re-
markable. But for the most part, we do not stop to think about whether
we are ameliorating or worsening social inequality through our transac-
tions—and do not feel obligated to do so.
We should not treat our lack of consideration of distributive issues in
contracting as evidence of their absence. The patchwork of means-tested
programs that comprise the social safety net should instead be appreci-
ated as institutions that limit the severity of distributive injustice for indi-
viduals, and thereby manage the moral risk individuals face in contract.
Parties do not usually know what the consequences of their contracting
behavior will be for many of their contracting partners because they do
not know much about them and because the consequences depend on
uncertain future events. But they do not have to investigate or even think
about the distributive impact of most transactions because they rely on
those institutions to blunt any negative impact they may have, and there-
fore, the scope of any harm they unintentionally inflict.
One should not mistake the low salience of distributive factors in
ordinary decisionmaking as inevitable. Many individuals experience them
as salient in ordinary transactions when in environments where one can-
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not count on background institutions to manage distributive-related
moral risk. In a developing country with a high incidence of absolute
poverty and high levels of social inequality, one is likely to feel con-
strained by the consequences of one’s transactional behavior on those
with whom one transacts.103 Moreover, one is likely to feel more responsi-
bility for how one’s dealings with the people one encounters affect them
than one does for the situation of others with whom one has no eco-
nomic interaction. The fact that one is able to proceed in the ordinary
American transaction without taking into account the economic status of
the other party is a function of background social policy. It is not that
contract formation is amoral: We experience contract formation as
amoral because the potential moral element is largely managed by exter-
nal institutions.
2. Equivalence of Exchange. — An alternative picture of moral risk in
contract formation relies on the principle of equivalency in exchange.
Studies have shown that individuals expect divisions of jointly produced
gains to be evenly divided,104 and transactional surpluses are an instance
of such gains, effectively divided by contract terms. Some scholars have
also argued that equivalence of exchange is essential to fair contracting,
drawing on Aristotelian theory of fair exchange.105 One might interpret
the principle of equivalency in exchange to require that transactional sur-
plus be more or less evenly divided. When one party, as the result of
greater bargaining power, is able to extract more than her fair share, she
is behaving in a blameworthy manner.
There is deep ambiguity in this view. Equivalence of exchange would
appear to require equivalence of the value that each party could expect
from the contract at the time of contract.106 In that case, there is no
moral risk in entering the contract; one either behaves morally by sharing
the expected transactional surplus, or one does not. But equivalence of
exchange might also be held to require some proportionality in the distri-
103. Of course, not everyone feels so constrained, nor would everyone regret a
transaction that turned out very badly for their partner. But they should. See Gardner,
Wrongs and Faults, supra note 44, at 125 (“[N]ot everyone actually experiences the R
relevant regrets. My point was that experiencing them is rationally appropriate. Our lives
should be blemished subjectively because and to the extent that they are blemished
objectively.”).
104. See Martin A. Nowak, Karen M. Page & Karl Sigmund, Fairness Versus Reason in
the Ultimatum Game, 289 Science 1773, 1773–74 (2000) (describing experiments in which
most individuals prefer to walk away empty handed rather than permit highly asymmetrical
division of fixed amount between themselves and another person).
105. See, e.g., James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1587, 1625
(1981) (“If there are reasons why a party should be free to exchange but should not be free
to redistribute wealth in his own favor, then the law should insist that he exchange without
redistributing. To put it another way, exchange should require equality.”).
106. Id. at 1612 (noting while “a society wishing to avoid redistributions of wealth
would prefer that contracts be equal in outcome and not merely actuarially,” it might
tolerate “actuarial equality” and enforce contracts that discount for market risk so long as
exchange occurs at market price).
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bution of the contract’s ultimate value. The requirement would not be as
stringent (in that small discrepancies would not be regarded as inconsis-
tent with the principle), but gross inequality of actual transactional sur-
plus ex post might also render the transaction wrongful on the part of the
luckier party.107 In that case, by agreeing to rules which temper the possi-
bility of such disparity in outcome, such as rules that permit good faith
modification or which excuse one party from performance under very
new circumstances, one effectively moderates the risk that one will find
oneself in a morally problematic position due to unexpected bad luck on
the part of the other party.
There are problems with this view. Intuitions regarding the fairness
of exchange cannot be generalized; people do not seem guilty about ex-
tracting most of the transactional surplus in ordinary consumer
purchases in competitive markets (where prices are forced toward margi-
nal cost). More generally, the disparity in bargaining power that drives
imbalances in transactional surplus is characteristic of many commercial
contracts about which people have little moral reservation.108 And
though the principle of equivalence of exchange may have a storied intel-
lectual history,109 it ultimately seems no more compelling than the ex
ante distribution it would preserve. Where the background distribution
on which it operates is itself the product of a series of market transac-
tions, each of which was uncertain at the time entered, there is little
ground to privilege their cumulative results over those of a single pro-
spective transaction with uncertainty of its own. For this reason, the prin-
ciple of equivalency of exchange seems incapable of discriminating be-
tween ex ante and ex post equivalency.110 However, for those who are
prepared to assess the moral quality of terms by whether they divide trans-
actional surplus fairly, moral risk arises in the choice of terms inasmuch
as there is uncertainty over how that surplus will be distributed ex post
and ex post results reflect on the moral character of the initial terms.111
107. In fact, this could be one way of understanding the doctrine of mutual mistake:
Courts are reluctant to allow a bargain to stand in which the result is overly lopsided, even
where the bargain was fair based on facts known to the parties at the time of contract.
Consider the classic case of Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923–24 (Mich. 1887)
(determining sale of cow was voided after seller learned cow was not infertile, as previously
believed).
108. See Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 Mich.
St. L. Rev. 579, 585 (“[T]he bare fact that one contracting party is more powerful than the
other, and, therefore, able to extract forms favorable to it, tells us little about the fairness
of the transaction, let alone the need for legal treatment favorable to the weaker party.”).
109. See Nicholas Theocarakis, Antipeponthos and Reciprocity: The Concept of
Equivalent Exchange from Aristotle to Turgot, 55 Int’l Rev. Econ. 29, 32–34 (2008)
(describing early intellectual history of concept).
110. Cf. Matt Adler & Chris Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal
Applications, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 279, 279–80 (2006) (discussing “ex ante/ex post problem”
in context of macro questions of distribution).
111. A weaker version of the requirement of equal exchange might claim just that
receipt of something of value generates an obligation to confer something of value, quite
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3. Choice of Terms as Exercise in Agency. — A third account of moral
risk in contract might deny the existence of moral duties on the part of
individual contracting parties, either stemming from distributive injustice
or from a principle of equivalency of exchange, but nevertheless acknowl-
edge responsibility for the outcomes associated with contractual acts.112
One might reject the idea that contracting parties can be blamed for
their choice of terms but still accept responsibility for certain outcomes
that flow from those terms. The choice of terms represents an act of
agency; the terms are within the parties’ control and a range of outcomes
for either party is foreseeable.113 Whether because one party has no de-
fault duty to the other party or because of the fact of consent by that
other party, there may be no culpability associated with the choice of con-
tract terms; the terms may not be blameworthy. But the parties may still
be responsible for the outcomes that ultimately flow from the arrange-
ments they have made.114 Moral judgments can be about either responsi-
bility or culpability; moral luck in contract formation, on this view, is a
problem only with respect to responsibility. Moral risk, then, can arise
when a party faces the prospect of being responsible for their contracting
partner’s misfortune, even when they are not to be blamed for it.
One might resist this line of reasoning by arguing that consent by
each party to a contract does more than immunize each party from blame
in connection with resulting harms to the other party; rather, consent has
the effect of confining responsibility for ill fortune under the contract to
the unlucky party alone. The significance of consent was discussed at
great length above.115 This Essay observes that responsibility can be
shared. Negligence by a victim may render her responsible for her own
loss, but it does not necessarily absolve the other party.116 Of course, it is
relevant to any obligation by the other party to compensate. But moral
risk is not about liability risk; it may be present even where there is no
threat of even a moral remedial obligation, let alone a legal one.117 A
apart from whether or what terms were agreed upon. The obligation to confer something
of value might not be an obligation to confer something of equal value. This principle
would appear to find support in doctrines like unjust enrichment. Even a weaker version of
the principle of fair exchange would explain moral risk in contract formation, since there
is a risk that the contract will be a losing transaction for the other party.
112. See Honoré, supra note 31, at 537–45 (introducing concept of outcome R
responsibility in absence of blameworthy conduct).
113. See generally Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 31 (developing and R
defending concept of outcome responsibility to encompass outcomes that are foreseeable
and one could have taken steps to avoid).
114. See Coleman, Mixed Conception, supra note 96, at 442 (“The duty to correct the R
losses derives not from the agent’s having done wrong as such, but from the losses being in
an appropriate sense the agent’s responsibility. They are the consequences of agency: the
agent’s causal power.”).
115. See supra Part II.
116. See supra Part II.D.
117. See Athanassoulis, supra note 13, at 275 (“Responsibility, blameworthiness and a R
desire to make reparations do not always go hand in hand.”).
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contracting party faces moral risk inasmuch as she may be the agent of
the other party’s misfortune, even where the other party is a fully-
functioning agent who has primary responsibility for her own fate.
It is worth noting the expansive character of responsibility on this
view. Responsibility for events that are foreseeable and within the control
of the contracting parties is far more sweeping than legal liability under a
contract. Although contract is often regarded as an institution of strict
liability because breaching parties are liable for breach irrespective of
why they breached,118 contract law does not impose liability for all the
harms that flow from individual actions; only those which result from
breach of a duty of a particular kind: the duty to fulfill contractual
promises. By transacting with someone, one may be the causal agent by
which a range of unfortunate events befall the other party, but one is
liable only where one’s breach is the mediating event. While a legal re-
gime that would operate differently has little to commend itself, it is not
obvious that moral responsibility tracks legal liability in this respect. That
is, while a party cannot be held morally accountable for all the ills that
befall her contracting partners as a result of their dealings with her, some
subset of harms which are foreseeable and could have been avoided
through different terms may indeed be her responsibility in some nonle-
gal sense. Because they set in motion a series of events that create new
risks, one tempts fate in a choice of contract terms. Because the actualiza-
tion of those risks turns on events outside one’s control, one’s decision to
run those risks is subject to moral luck.
This third account of moral risk in contract formation is compatible
with the first view. One might see the risk of moral wrong (blameworthy
conduct) in some subset of contracting in which distributive issues are
implicated but see the more benign risk of moral responsibility for loss in
other cases. The distinction could be analogous to the role of moral luck
in criminal law and tort law, respectively. When criminals are punished,
criminal conduct is condemned. But when a defendant is held liable in
tort, even for intentional conduct, she is not necessarily faulted for her
action; the law only requires that she compensate her victim for harm she
has inflicted, even if that conduct was justified or excused.119
The distinction between blameworthy conduct and merely wrongful
conduct carries over to the contract context. The materialization of the
risk that one’s transactional activity exacerbates distributive injustice may
118. See Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in
Contract Law, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 3013, 3017 (2007) (“Under our strict liability regime, a
breach alone suffices for liability regardless of whether the breaching party was justified—
morally or otherwise—in breaching.”).
119. For elaboration of this distinction, see Gardner, Wrongs and Faults, supra note
44, at 100 (discussing famous case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 124 N.W. R
221 (Minn. 1910), in which defendant justifiably used property to weather storm but was
still liable for resulting damage to property); see also id. at 120–21 (explaining “[p]rivate
law cares about wrongdoing” but fault principle governs criminal punishment).
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render the antecedent contractual choices blameworthy. But the risk that
one’s choice of terms will be blameworthy is more limited than the larger
risk that, in even ordinary contract settings, a jointly produced contract
will result in harm to one’s contracting partner. Although the choice of
terms in even a hard-driven bargain is not condemnable in itself, it still
leaves each side vulnerable to responsibility of a sort for subsequent losses
suffered by the other, which may or may not be reflected in liability. One
does not wish, through contract, to be either the engineer or the engine
of another’s misfortune.
4. Involuntary Relational Duties Toward Contractual Partners. — Finally,
one might perceive moral risk in contract formation while conceding that
prior to entering contract, one is not morally responsible for the eco-
nomic fortunes of one’s potential contractual partners. One might even
concede that one does not usually assume responsibility for their fortunes
through contract. It might nevertheless be the case that contract results
in a new position vis-à-vis one’s partners, which creates new reasons for
responding to or at least taking into account their fortunes ex post, even
where not required by contract. It may be among the unintended (in the
sense of not sought out) but consistently foreseeable consequences of en-
tering into a relationship of exchange that the quality of that exchange
from the perspective of the other party becomes a matter of concern to
oneself. Such concern may be a moral dimension of promising that is not
easily or even possibly shed through articulated attempts to avoid it. Such
attempts may be as ineffectual as an attempt to discount the moral effect
of a promise: If the promise is successful, the moral obligation is
unavoidable.120
The idea is that contract may create not only perfect, voluntary obli-
gations, but also involuntary, imperfect duties arising out of the relation-
ship that sometimes accompanies contract. While this Essay does not de-
fend this view, it is one way of understanding the state of the contract
world as depicted in the relational theories of contract developed by Ian
Macneil, as well as other contract theories that emphasize the relational
values of contracting.121
If contracting has this dual effect, then there may exist some moral
obligation to anticipate and accommodate the moral duties one will later
120. See Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 801, 813
(2008) (“My plea that in doing some act, P, I manifestly did not intend to attract a moral
obligation to do X, cannot justify or excuse my not doing X if doing P is otherwise
sufficient to obligate me to do X.”).
121. See generally Ian R. Macneil, The Relational Theory of Contract (David
Campbell ed., 2001) (covering Macneil’s various works on the subject); Ian R. Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978) (discussing how economic and
contractual relations plan for, and respond to, change); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963)
(explaining that transactional planning and legal sanctions occur when beneficial to
parties involved).
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face—even if those duties do not presently apply.122 This intuition, with
its ambiguities, is similar to the intuition that people have that they ought
not to do things now that will make life more unattractive for a future
child.123 While they may not acknowledge any present duty to the
nonexistent child, it is part of being a morally responsible, continuous
person that one take into account how what one does now affects both
the duties one will later have and the probability that one will (in the
future) fulfill them. Just as people act on obligations that were created by
their former selves, though they may disassociate and perhaps only dimly
recollect the values and circumstances under which those obligations
were assumed, they should also act on obligations that they anticipate in
the future. Although one cannot now anticipate the subjective experi-
ence of future values and circumstances, if one can predict the resulting
future obligations, they may make demands on one’s present agency. The
phenomenon may be present in contract, in which case the moral risk in
contract formation refers not to the risk of wrongful present choices but
the risk that present choices will result in a future wrong within the con-
text of the new relationship engendered by contract.
These four pictures of moral risk at the stage of contract formation
are not all compatible with each other, though they need not be full-
fledged alternatives to each other either. Contract choices may have
moral salience for a combination of reasons. The point is that more than
one understanding of contract supports the proposition that the choice
of contract terms is accompanied by moral risk.
122. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A
Kantian Response to Parfit, 18 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 101, 113–14 (1989) (“[W]e both
presuppose and construct a continuity of identity and of agency. . . . [Y]ou need to identify
with your future in order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an
agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self.”); see also
Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism 28 (1970) (arguing from interest of self in
future self to interest of self in others); Susan Wolf, Self-Interest and Interest in Selves, 96
Ethics 704, 708–09 (1986) (defending person over time as appropriate locus of moral
interest, as compared to slice of experience). The relevant legal literature tends to focus
on what obligations we have directly to future persons (whose lives may or may not
temporally overlap with our own) rather than on our duty to anticipate obligations that we
will later have. See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem,
and Legal Liability, 60 Hastings L.J. 347, 348 (2008) (discussing potential tort liability for
conceiving a disabled fetus); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Note, Justice Unconceived: How
Posterity Has Rights, 14 Yale J.L. & Human. 393, 397 (2002) (“Recognizing future people’s
rights is not a radical proposition requiring revolutionary changes to current moral
categories and legal practices . . . .”).
123. Cf. Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev.
L.J. 1, 32–34 (2007) (discussing balance between basic right of couples and individuals to
choose procreation freely and needs and rights of both living and future children); Philip
G. Peters, Jr., Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the Children of Reproductive
Technology, 8 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 375, 386 (1999) (noting “prima facie duty to minimize
suffering” of future children).
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B. Moral Luck in Contract Performance
Decisions made after the conclusion of a contract are also subject to
moral luck. However, these decisions are subject to a different variety of
moral luck. Rather than turning on the unpredictable outcomes that flow
from the choice of terms, they turn on the moral choices parties face. In
the terminology introduced by Nagel, they are subject to circumstantial
luck.124 An individual who does not have to make morally difficult
choices, who is not “tested,” enjoys positive moral luck of this sort. An
individual who is given an unusual opportunity to commit moral wrong,
or who can perform her duties only at great cost to herself, has bad moral
luck. The classic example of circumstantial luck is the contrast between
two morally comparable individuals, one of whom ends up committing
evil and thereby becoming evil in the context of a corrupt society, while
the other, equally capable of evil, lives out a benign and unremarkable
life.125 Fortunately, the moral risks of contract are not so dramatic as that.
Nor are postcontract moral risks “tragic” in the sense that circum-
stances may make it impossible for individuals to escape wrongdoing.126
Temptations to breach are just that. In some cases, one may be obligated
to breach in order to fulfill some duty to a third party (for example, per-
formance of another obligation makes performance of a certain contrac-
tual obligation impossible, or breach of a contractual obligation makes it
possible to acquire the resources to fulfill some other obligation). But in
the usual case, opportunities for breach are merely attractive. They make
breach more likely, but wrongdoing is not inevitable.
Nevertheless, a number of ex post events do create moral tests, or at
least potential moral responsibilities, that not all contracting parties face.
First, new opportunities or costs arise, which make breach of a contrac-
tual promise desirable. Second, new costs to the other party present us
with requests for modification.
1. Breach of Contract. — The notion that breach of contract consti-
tutes a wrong to the nonbreaching party is familiar. Empirical studies sug-
124. But see Norvin Richards, Luck and Desert, 95 Mind 198, 206 (1986) (positing
moral luck should affect moral verdicts); Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and Moral
Responsibility, 97 Ethics 374, 374–75 (1987) (arguing against proposition of moral luck).
Both are prepared to condemn equally those who would commit an immoral act but are
not placed in circumstances in which it is a possible course of action.
125. Most examples of circumstantial luck revolve around the bad moral luck of being
present in Nazi Germany. An exception, not specifically oriented toward the more general
problem of moral luck, is Allen Buchanan, Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology, 32
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 95, 129 (2004) (discussing moral risk of growing up in racist society and
arguing “for liberal institutions . . . relying upon . . . the commitment to ameliorating the
moral and prudential risks to which we are all liable by virtue of our social epistemic
dependency”).
126. See Todd Bernard Weber, Tragic Dilemmas and the Priority of the Moral, 4 J.
Ethics 191, 192 (2000) (describing tragic dilemmas).
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gest that most people view breach in moral terms.127 Seana Shiffrin has
argued expressly that breach of contract may constitute a wrong,128 and
other contract scholars, like Daniel Markovits, have offered theories of
contract that imply that breach is a wrong to the nonbreaching party.129
But the idea of breach of contract as immoral has also been chal-
lenged by legal economists, whose account of breach and of contract it-
self in utilitarian terms casts the former in a positive light.130 The theory
of efficient breach would seem to condone breach under certain circum-
stances. Economic theories of contract explain how breach with only ex-
pectation damages incentivizes parties to breach when it is a good thing
to do so—good not only for the breaching party but for everyone, includ-
ing possibly the nonbreaching party, who paid a lower price due to the
other party’s anticipation of the possibility of a lucrative breach.131 If
breach is sometimes socially productive, and if the law is intended to en-
courage breach under the right circumstances, then the opportunity to
breach at a profit hardly seems like a moral disaster that befalls breachers
and compromises their sense of control over their moral destinies.
Breach triggered by an increase of costs that renders performance un-
profitable may be a minor disaster of sorts, but on this view the disaster
has no moral dimension.
This section presents the argument that first, behavior that is socially
productive may nevertheless constitute a wrong to a particular other indi-
vidual; and second, although breach is not blameworthy, it renders a
breaching party morally responsible for the losses of the nonbreaching
party. Whether one views breach as a culpable wrong or as an act that
renders an agent morally responsible for subsequent losses to the other
party, the prospect of a situational change that makes breach tempting
(that is to say, makes breach rational) creates moral risk.
Steve Shavell has argued that breach does not constitute a wrong
because the breaching party is obligated to compensate.132 Specifically,
127. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral
Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 405, 423 (2009) (concluding
“the connection between law and morality is not a philosophical abstraction; for most
people, it is an entrenched component of their intuitions about legal decision making”).
128. Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1551,
1552 (2009) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Could Breach].
129. Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L.J. 1417, 1446–74
(2004).
130. See Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 Emory L.J. 439, 442–58
(2006) [hereinafter Shavell, Immoral] (“[W]hen efficient breach does occur, it coincides
with the terms of completely detailed contractual promises and thus should not be seen as
immoral . . . . [This] conclusion flows from the logic explaining the nature of the contract
that the parties themselves would want . . . .”).
131. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing theory of efficient breach). R
132. See Shavell, Immoral, supra note 130, at 441 (“[W]e can deduce from the fact R
that the party in breach was willing to pay the expectation measure of damages that the
breach was probably not immoral because the parties likely would not have stipulated
performance had they addressed the contingency that arose.”).
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he argues that at the time of contract both parties would have agreed to
allow the other party to breach the contractual promise under certain
circumstances because it would lower the price of each potential
breacher’s performance. Shavell could be arguing that each party should
be treated as having in fact agreed to a “perform or pay” type promise,
but this would be at odds with how many (but not all) contractual
promises are in fact structured, as well as the self-understanding of many
(but not all) parties.133
Shavell seems instead to hinge the force of his argument on the hy-
pothetical consent of the parties to breach under certain circumstances.
But then one is faced with the problem of accounting for why express
obligations assumed by a party should be revised in light of what the
other party might, perhaps should, agree to when they have not in fact
agreed to it.134 After all, there are usually many combinations of terms to
which a party might have agreed, but the other party is not regarded as
entitled to unilaterally substitute any of those alternative agreements for
the contract actually concluded.135 They are not permitted to do so even
where it is plausible that the parties would have contracted along the
lines envisioned in the alternative had they been privy to information
now available.136 Were one party to pursue a privately conceived, alterna-
tive vision of her contract, she would likely breach or claim breach where
the court would not recognize breach by the other party. Hypothetical
consent does not justify conduct under a contract, nor does it create obli-
gation where the existing contract does not appear to create it. Thus,
hypothetical consent is not enough to explain why damages are a coequal
alternative to performance where the initial contract is not structured as
perform-or-pay. Damages are best understood as the law itself treats
them: remedial obligations that stem from the underlying obligation to
perform. They are not usually equivalent to performance and, where
breach is otherwise blameworthy, do not render the breacher blameless.
If the availability of damages does not excuse breach of contractual
promises, the fact that it may be socially useful is not enough to make it
133. See Aditi Bagchi, Unequal Promises, 72 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 467, 482 (2011)
(discussing both legal and subjective understandings of contractual promises and
describing possible deviations from “perform or pay” promise).
134. See Shiffrin, Could Breach, supra note 128, at 1567 (criticizing Shavell’s view on R
morality of breach).
135. For example, if one contracts to have a driveway cleared of snow on Monday for
$100, it would constitute breach to arrive on Tuesday, even if one charges only $50 and
even if the homeowner would have preferred delayed service for a lower price.
136. The previous example holds even if it turns out that the street is not plowed until
Tuesday, such that clearing the driveway in accordance with the contract would have
delivered no additional gain to the homeowner. Of course, the consequences to the
homeowner of breach are relevant to the calculation of damages, but whether the
homeowner would have agreed to different terms with information the parties acquire ex
post does not speak to the preliminary question of breach, unless the original contract is
actually modified by mutual consent.
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right, either.137 Consider that the role of damages in efficient breach the-
ory is limited to incentivizing efficient behavior; damages do not make
efficient breaches efficient.138 That is, were a party to breach where her
resources were valued more highly outside of an existing contract, that
breach would be efficient even if she did not compensate the nonbreach-
ing party; the marginal effect on the future practice of contract would
usually be offset by the allocative efficiency furthered by breach. If the
fact that a particular breach is socially productive is enough to make it
“not wrong,” then it must not be a wrong even in the absence of compen-
sation. That result is intuitively implausible.
The intuition stems from the recognition that reasons that apply to a
promisor are prototypically agent-relative—they are reasons that apply
specifically to the promisor to fulfill obligations that she has created spe-
cifically to the promisee.139 While the reasons applicable to a contractual
promisor may differ from the reasons that apply to promisors in other
contexts, both types of reasons differ from those relevant to the adoption
of a legal rule awarding expectation damages, which may incentivize effi-
cient breach. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to defend the existence
or coherence of agent-relative reasons. Assuming that such reasons in-
deed bind individuals in ways that do not generalize to all agents, what
are the specific reasons that a contracting party has to fulfill a contractual
promise? Individuals have reasons not to use others, through contract
and subsequent breach, in a way that impedes others’ plans and projects.
Contracting parties are often aware of the purposes for which their
contractual partners have entered into contract.140 From such knowledge
137. For a more general philosophical argument that individual moral obligations are
not reducible to an obligation to maximize an overall state of affairs, see  Paul Hurley,
Agent-Centered Restrictions: Clearing the Air of Paradox, 108 Ethics 120, 122 (1997).
138. In contrast to the more rigorous requirements of Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency is obtained so long as one party gains enough to offset the losses of the other
party, without requiring transfers. See J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics,
49 Econ. J. 696, 701, 711 (1939) (discussing welfare movements that would be Pareto-
superior if accompanied by compensation for losers, but noting likely disagreement about
conditions under which compensation should be offered); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare
Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ. J. 549, 550
(1939) (arguing economist need not defend proposed policy on grounds that “nobody in
the community is going to suffer,” but need only demonstrate it would be possible to
compensate losers and still improve welfare of others).
139. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing agent-relative reasons and R
corresponding academic literature).
140. Consider cases that refuse to restrict damages under a Hadley rule (limiting
damages to those were foreseeable to breaching party at time of contract) on the grounds
that the business purpose of a transaction was self-evident, Victoria Laundry (Windsor),
Ltd. v. Newman Indus., Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528 (C.A.) at 540 (Eng.), or which excuse
performance on the grounds that the obvious purpose of the contract has been frustrated,
Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493 (C.A.) at 493 (Eng.); Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B.
740 (C.A.) at 740 (Eng.) (discussing frustration in context of contracts to rent space to view
coronation procession of King Edward VII when king became ill and coronation was
rescheduled); Griffith v. Brymer, (1903) 19 T.L.R. 434 (K.B.) at 434 (Eng.) (same).
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follows an understanding that their breach will impair another person’s
project. It does not require any special sentiment either for the project or
the person; in this regard, it differs from ordinary promising, in which a
promisor may adopt certain reasons of the promisee as her own. The
value of a contracting party’s project to the other party is more akin to
the value everyone must recognize in the preferences and plans of fellow
citizens in a liberal democratic society; respect for fellow citizens as per-
sons means assigning value to “things” that have value to others for rea-
sons one does not share (they may be idiosyncratic, religious, or conscien-
tious) even when one does not attach value to them directly. People have
reason to accommodate practices they find bizarre, preserve structures
they find appalling, and enable lifestyles they find distasteful, merely be-
cause they are valued by others. Many of these reasons apply at the level
of politics. But such reasons also operate at the interpersonal level, in that
not only a state but a person may be liberal. Liberal persons may be use-
ful, if not necessary, to sustain a liberal polity, but this Essay uses the term
here just to describe the respectful attitude of a person toward the
projects of others. The attitude is familiar because it is the attitude
adopted in liberal politics.
Breach after contract usually does inflict harm on others by imped-
ing their projects. The passage of time between contract formation and
breach, in the usual case, implies that the state of the world in which a
party elected to contract with a particular other party on specified terms
has passed, and the particular constellation of opportunities of that world
have vanished with it. Fuller and Perdue noted long ago that expectation
damages may be nothing more than a more accurate account of reliance
damages than reliance damages based on direct evidence of reliance.141
The economic version of this account of expectation damages empha-
sizes that, in a competitive market, the terms available from one seller are
identical to the terms available from any number of other sellers of like
goods or services.142 As such, the opportunity cost dimension of reliance
is equal to the expected benefit from the contract actually concluded. But
the point extends outside of competitive markets, where the claim is not
141. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 55 (1936) (“[T]hough reliance ordinarily results in ‘losses’ of
an affirmative nature . . . it is also true that opportunities for gain may be foregone in
reliance on a promise. Hence the reliance interest must be interpreted as at least
potentially covering ‘gains prevented’ as well as ‘losses caused.’”).
142. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Law and Economics of Price
Discrimination in Modern Economies: Time for Reconciliation?, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1235, 1256 (2010) (noting in “perfectly operating competitive market . . . all purchasers
would pay the same price for any given product”); James F. Nieberding & Robin A. Cantor,
Price Dispersion and Class Certification in Antitrust Cases: An Economic Analysis, 14 J.
Legal Econ. 61, 73–74 (2007) (“The law-of-one price . . . states that in competitive markets
comprised of many buyers and sellers, identical goods and services ought to sell in a given
market at identical prices . . . under conditions of product homogeneity, zero transaction
costs, zero search costs, no informational asymmetries, and no market imperfections.”).
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that expectation damages represent full reliance, but just the lesser claim
that breach usually represents a loss to the nonbreaching party. Such
losses occur, in some sense, at the moment of contract, but at the time of
formation, are presumably worthwhile to the party that consciously
foregoes other opportunities in favor of a given contract. In fact, the
value of foregone opportunities is often limited in light of the contract
that took their place. But when the other party to the contract later
breaches, the loss is realized; lost opportunities are once again valuable
but no longer available. Again, because these losses jeopardize the plans
and projects of those who bear them, there is reason not to inflict such
losses and impede those plans.
The state has a reason to favor legal rules that will limit losses, but
this reason must be balanced with a number of related reasons in electing
the best legal rule. Those calculations and considerations differ from
those applicable to a particular contracting party, who appropriately as-
signs special weight both to his private reasons in favor of breach as well
as the obligation not to inflict harms on others. More generally, the state
has reason to facilitate everyone’s plans and projects (with exceptions),
and a general rule that promotes that end at the expense of certain indi-
viduals at certain times cannot be said to affirmatively use those individu-
als in the same way that a single contracting party uses a person with
whom she contracts only to later breach. The legal rule itself does not
contemplate or inflict losses on any particular individual because it pre-
dates any particular agreement, let alone any breach that gives rise to loss.
The legal rule does not single out an individual as she who will bear the
cost of the social rule; that selection is made by individual contracting
parties—the individuals who chose to breach. While the background le-
gal rule precedes the choice of contracting party and the subsequent de-
cision to breach, the likely consequences for the breaching and non-
breaching party under the present legal regime are background facts in
the decision to breach.
Even if one denies agent-relative reasons for a contracting party not
to breach a contract (the reasons suggested above and others), one can
make sense of the prevailing intuition that the social utility of a given
breach does not excuse the event as between the breaching and non-
breaching parties so long as one allows for multiple perspectives of judg-
ment. That is, even if one denies that agent-relative reasons bind individ-
uals to perform acts that do not optimize a state of the world, one might
concede that, outside the domain of moral reasons, different considera-
tions apply to differently situated agents.
Civil recourse theories emphasize the particular perspective of the
plaintiff-victim in the context of torts as distinct from that of society at
large, and argue for the priority of that perspective within the private law
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domain.143 One of the many insights made by Williams in connection
with his observations on moral luck was that the presence or absence of
reasons justifying conduct from an external point of view does not pre-
empt an analysis of whether conduct is regrettable from the standpoint of
the agent in question.144 While it may be commonplace to accept con-
tractual breach as socially acceptable or even socially desirable under cer-
tain conditions, even if those considerations were taken to justify breach,
it would not release contractual parties from appropriate regret with re-
spect to their failure to perform their contractual promises.
One might deny that the moral reasons that bear on a potential
breaching party are distinct from the moral reasons relevant to a legal
rule that prefers or prevents breach under various scenarios, on the
grounds that the reasons that appear to differ are not appropriately char-
acterized as moral. But even then, one can agree that the totality of rea-
sons—including amoral reasons—that apply to an individual deciding
whether to breach are different from the totality of considerations rele-
vant to a policymaker setting the relevant legal rule. While it may be com-
monplace to accept contractual breach as socially acceptable or even so-
cially desirable under certain conditions, even if those considerations
justified a legal rule that makes breach attractive, those reasons do not
represent the universe of considerations relevant to a decision whether to
perform one’s own contractual promise.145
The moral risk endemic in the possibility of breach (or more pre-
cisely in the possibility of circumstances that make breach attractive) does
not depend on viewing breach as a culpable wrong. The agent-relative
reasons that bear on the decision to breach are not necessarily of a type
that make breach blameworthy. Consistent with intuitions that breach of
contract is different from breach of ordinary promise,146 one can avoid
or concede the question of whether breach constitutes a wrong but insist
that a breaching party bears a special responsibility for losses from
breach. Even if breach can be regarded as justified in light of systemic
considerations, a breaching party is responsible for resulting losses in the
way a trespasser who has entered another’s property on grounds of neces-
143. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Tort Law, supra note 3, at 1135 (noting tort law R
“empowers victims to respond to wrongdoers whose wrongs have injured”).
144. Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 1, at 27. Nagel and others have described R
Williams’s conception of agent-regret as ultimately an amoral notion. See Nagel, Mortal
Questions supra note 1, at 69 n.3 (“My disagreement with Williams is that his account fails
to explain why such retrospective attitudes can be called moral.”). It may be an essential
feature of morality that it be a source of universal reason and judgments. One cannot
revise a moral concept to one as relativistic as agent-regret and have it retain its moral
character. One cannot endorse the moral quality of an action but still condemn it as
immoral from the particular point of view of a particular actor.
145. For further discussion of how the reasons relevant to a legal rule differ from the
reasons relevant to moral judgment of individual action, see infra Part IV.
146. See Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(distinguishing voluntary character of private promises from contractual promises).
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sity is accountable to the property owner. The trespass was justified and
cannot be condemned, but the trespasser should still feel responsible for
her violation of the property owner’s background right. In particular, the
trespasser is still obligated to remedy the trespass by compensating the
owner.147 Similarly, payment of damages by a party breaching a contract
is not just a means by which courts try to motivate people to breach if,
and only if, it is efficient to do so; assignment of damages expresses re-
sponsibility to the breaching party for the nonbreaching party’s losses,
irrespective of whether the breach constituted a culpable wrong.
The circumstances that make breach rational are not unanticipated
as a general matter but unpredictable in a specific case. Whether one sees
breach as a culpable wrong or as an occasion for special moral responsi-
bility, breach represents moral risk.
2. Requests for Modification. — The other moral choice to which post-
contractual events may give rise is whether to acquiesce to a request for
modification of contract terms. A request may be triggered by a rise in
costs of performance by the other side, or simply by the availability of a
more lucrative option for the other party. Presumably, a contracting party
is not obligated to release the other party from performance on existing
terms so that the other party might seek higher fortunes. The other party
is free to breach and compensate, if worthwhile. But where misfortune
makes a transaction especially burdensome for the other party, and modi-
fied terms would make the agreement mutually profitable, the party of
whom modification is being requested has reason to prevent substantial
loss to the other party by consenting to modified terms.148
Again, a refusal to modify terms does not constitute a culpable
wrong. But because the original terms represent choices as to the alloca-
tion of risk, and because those allocations are both under the control of
the parties and have foreseeable (albeit uncertain) consequences, con-
147. See Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2
Law & Phil. 5, 7–8 (1983) (“Sometimes the justifiable, i.e., nonwrongful, taking of what
another has a well-established right to justifies a claim to rectification.”); Joel Feinberg,
Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 93, 102 (1978)
(stressing “almost everyone would agree that you owe compensation to the homeowner”
for justified trespass).
148. This reason is not dispositive and may be overridden by other considerations,
including self-interest. The point here is that there is shared responsibility for outcomes of
a transaction—and that this justifies distinguishing between requests for modification
prompted by unexpected opportunity and requests prompted by unexpected costs.
Notably, this view is consistent with the asymmetry we see in the legal rule itself, which
treats increased costs as a change in circumstance that may motivate good faith
modification but treats demands for modification based on increased opportunity costs as
bad faith, if not extortion. An economic perspective fails to account for this asymmetry,
instead focusing on whether a threat to breach is credible. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-
Shahar, Threatening an “Irrational” Breach of Contract, 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 143, 145
(2004) (“Economic analysis provides a standard tool to evaluate the issue of threat
credibility . . . . It is only when the pecuniary loss from performance exceeds the pecuniary
cost of breach that the threat is deemed credible.”).
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tract places parties in a position where they are mutually responsible for
the course of the transaction for both sides. In that case, while refusing a
good faith modification is not blameworthy, some responsibility for the
losses of the other party nevertheless attaches to an uncooperative party.
Entering into contract, one is subject to the risk that one will later be
called upon to “save” one’s contracting partner from such losses.
IV. LAW AS A TOOL FOR MANAGING MORAL RISK IN CONTRACT
Numerous scholars have grappled with the challenge of moral luck.
If the concept rightly identifies a fundamental tension in our moral
precepts—if it upends the Kantian orthodoxy that moral action is within
the control of the moral agent and that the morality of action and agents
is never arbitrary—then one cannot really “solve the problem.”149 One
can, however, live with it.
As discussed above, criminal law theory has grappled with moral luck
primarily in the context of attempt. Scholars disagree on whether at-
tempts should be punished less severely than completed crimes, but the
debate has shed new light on potential competing grounds for criminal
liability and on the very purposes of punishment.150
Tort law has similarly come to terms with moral luck.151 Scholars of
both corrective justice and civil recourse theory are committed to the
idea of a tort as a kind of wrong.152 Both see the relevant question as
whether the wrongdoer is responsible, not whether she is culpable and
149. See Andrew Latus, Moral and Epistemic Luck, 25 J. Phil. Res. 149, 166 (2000)
(“Our attempts to solve the problem of moral luck have been misguided. Attempts to show
that cases of moral luck do not occur are futile. The existence of moral luck is both
inescapable and worrying.”).
150. For a summary of scholarship on either side of this debate, see supra notes
46–47. R
151. But see Alexander, Corrective Justice, supra note 3, at 23 (rejecting tort system as R
indefensibly arbitrary); Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation and Moral
Responsibility, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, supra note 3, at 347, 353 (same); R
Waldron, Moments of Carelessness, supra note 3, at 388 (same). R
152. John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky expressly argue that torts should be viewed as
wrongs, but deny that corrective justice theorists similarly account for torts as wrongs. John
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917, 918, 925
(2010) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Wrongs]. However, numerous scholars
associated with corrective justice theory understand themselves to be concerned with
explaining torts as wrongs. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 11, 147
(1995)(“[A]n internal account . . . interprets . . . [a] right of action simply as what it
purports to be: the assertion of a right by the plaintiff in response to a wrong suffered at
the hands of the defendant.”); Arthur Ripstein, As if It Had Never Happened, 48 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1957, 1962 (2007) (distinguishing between harms and wrongs); John
Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice 52 (University of
Oxford Legal Research Paper No. 1/2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1538342 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Tort law is
concerned with the wrongs one committed, one’s wrongful actions.”).
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blameworthy.153 More broadly than in the criminal context, it has been
largely accepted that a wrong is not a simple function of culpability, and
that responsibility (or at least some variant of responsibility) turns on out-
comes as well as intent.154 In some cases, the requirement of actual injury
is seen as more fundamental to responsibility than the requirement of
fault in a negligence regime.155 Responsibility suffices to justify the impo-
sition of civil liability in tort.
Does moral luck similarly illuminate some dimension of contract
law? This Part suggests that one can understand background institutions
as mitigating the moral risk inherent in contract formation while contract
law itself attenuates the circumstantial risk that arises post-contract. The
legal institutions that manage moral risk for contracting parties extend
well beyond the domain of contract law and manage risk outside of con-
tract as well. However, this Essay focuses on the way in which law attenu-
ates moral risk in the contractual context.
A. Safety Nets as Collective Tools of Moral Risk Management
Ex ante, the primary way in which legal institutions make the prac-
tice of contract morally tolerable is to provide a safety net such that one
can transact without fear that one will be the engine of calamity for one’s
contractual partners. That safety net is both the social safety net of the
welfare state and other economic institutions such as tax write-offs and
bankruptcy. Because the social safety net ensures that bargaining partners
are not excessively vulnerable or needy in absolute terms, parties may
proceed in ordinary transactions without inquiry into the situations of
their contractual partners.
Once one observes this function of the safety net, one can see in
another light the comparative weakness of existing safety nets and the
comparative freedom of contracting parties in the common law to depart
from standard terms. As contracts are usually formed at arms length be-
tween individuals who do not owe each other any special duties (as
friends or family, for example), the perception of moral risk at the stage
of contract formation will reflect on the perception of the breadth and
depth of precontractual duty between persons. The common law has tra-
ditionally been reluctant to recognize any such duties, which has been
153. See Coleman, Risks & Wrongs, supra note 35, at 325 (distinguishing retributive R
justice from corrective justice and associating private law with latter); Goldberg & Zipursky,
Wrongs, supra note 152, at 951 (“Liability is imposed even though the defendant has R
caused harm through conduct that the courts themselves are at pains to say is entirely
permissible.”).
154. For literature on outcome responsibility and tort, see supra note 31. R
155. See Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes, supra note 31, at 121 (distinguishing R
between failing to take care not to injure and causing injury); Goldberg & Zipursky, Tort
Law, supra note 3, at 1135 (“The reckless driver, when his recklessness ripens into the R
running down of a victim, is literally re-sponse-able by (and therefore to) the victim . . . in a
way that the reckless driver who does not injure anyone is not.”).
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most directly challenged in the context of the (lack of) duty to rescue.156
Common law countries, unlike civil law countries, lack a precontractual
duty to bargain in good faith.157 The perception of limited duty toward
contracting partners—at least prior to contract—is consistent with a com-
paratively low level of perceived moral risk. If parties do not owe anything
to those with whom they contract, that is, if there are no duties that con-
strain our negotiation of contract terms, then those terms cannot be
wrongful acts. This, in turn, is consistent with low levels of insurance
through collective institutions against the risk of harm resulting from
wrongful acts.158
Even a limited conception of background duties between persons in
the contractual context would not eliminate moral risk altogether. The
156. A duty to rescue may be imposed either by tort or criminal law. For arguments
challenging the prevailing rule in the United States that bystanders have no duty to aid, see
Theodore M. Benditt, Liability for Failing to Rescue, 1 Law & Phil. 391, 396 (1982)
(“[T]here can be a duty to rescue even though one’s failure to rescue does not cause the
harm that befalls the victim.”); Alison McIntyre, Guilty Bystanders?: On the Legitimacy of
Duty to Rescue Statutes, 23 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 157, 160 (1994) (“The duty to give emergency
assistance is grounded . . . in the state’s duty to protect the general welfare and in the
reasonableness of the burden imposed on citizens who are ‘deputized’ to report
emergencies or to provide easily rendered assistance.”); Arthur Ripstein, Three Duties to
Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal, 19 Law & Phil. 751, 751 (2000) (arguing for “a criminal
penalty for certain failures to rescue”); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90
Yale L.J. 247, 251 (1980) (“[A] duty of easy rescue would strengthen an already-broad
pattern of common-law principles and . . . such a duty can plausibly be justified within both
of the ethical traditions that inform the common-law system.”).
157. See John Klein & Carla Bachechi, Precontractual Liability and the Duty of Good
Faith Negotiation in International Transactions, 17 Hous. J. Int’l L. 1, 16 (1994) (“A
primary distinction between the civil and common law approaches to the duty of good
faith is that the latter generally imposes no good faith obligation prior to the execution of
the contract.”); Ralph B. Lake, Letters of Intent: A Comparative Examination Under
English, U.S., French, and West German Law, 18 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 331, 346–48
(1984) (noting United States and England traditionally “did not recognize a contract to
make a contract or an agreement to bargain”). However, Klein and Bachechi argue that
other doctrines do impose precontractual liability for precontractual conduct. Klein &
Bachechi, supra, at 16; see also Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo,
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 401, 408 (1964) (arguing range of doctrines recreate precontractual duty of good
faith in common law).
158. See Torben M. Andersen, International Integration, Risk and the Welfare State,
104 Scandinavian J. Econ. 343, 345 (2002) (“In a broad interpretation of the welfare state
we can . . . include all public sector activities which affect the risk faced by society and its
individuals as instruments for social risk diversification or insurance.”). The United States
is the prototypical example of a state with low levels of social insurance. See Gøsta Esping-
Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies 75 (1999) (discussing how
United States uses “narrow conception of what risks should be considered ‘social’”); Gøsta
Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 21, 53–54 (1990) (discussing
continuously low “de-commodification” of individuals in United States, defined by lack of
inviolable social rights “granted on basis of citizenship rather than performance”). See
generally Agnar Sandmo, Introduction: The Welfare Economics of the Welfare State, 97
Scandinavian J. Econ. 469 (1995) (discussing costs and benefits of welfare state, including
social insurance and redistribution).
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risk of responsibility for harm resulting from contract remains, as it does
not depend on the breach of either a background duty or a voluntary
obligation. But it seems plausible that those who deny the existence of
background duties between contractual partners are also less likely to be
moved by the prospect of responsibility for contractual partners’ losses,
where those losses are not even traceable to breach of contract. Thus,
some legal cultures can be expected to be more sensitive to moral risk in
contract than others.
Indeed, the institutions that manage moral risk between strangers
who are not yet parties to contract are just those which manage material
risk. Means-tested welfare programs, large-scale social insurance pro-
grams, bankruptcy protections, regulations on insurance access and cov-
erage, tax deductions for various losses—each of these practices reflect
the degree to which a society is inclined to pool brute luck.159 But they
simultaneously (and relatedly) reflect on the extent to which society per-
ceives robust duties flowing directly between individuals, duties that gen-
erate moral risks which, if they are not to overwhelm daily life, must
themselves be collectively managed. By tempering market outcomes
more broadly, social programs lower the stakes of contract for every con-
tracting party and reduce the corresponding moral risk for their con-
tracting partners.
B. Contract Law as a Tool for Managing Ex Post Moral Risk
Even in the common law, once parties enter a contract, they are
thrust into a relationship in which they are concerned with the moral
character of their conduct toward the other. Even if one operates under
the myth of a blank slate prior to contract, one must recognize that con-
tract creates dyadic obligations that run between individuals. Ex post, sev-
eral doctrines in contract operate to manage moral risk.160 They re-
present tools by which individuals manage their own moral risk because
individuals opt into the contract law regime by making their promises
legally enforceable.
First, contract law awards damages. The obligation to pay damages
upon breach substantially limits the harm one can do through breach.
Notably, in those promissory relations in which the wrong of breach does
159. Of course, there is a political economic story behind each of these programs, but
I take these narratives to be the more detailed content of any claim about legal culture.
160. My argument that, by subjecting their promises to the regime of contract law,
parties moderate the severity of their later choices (from the standpoint of their
promisees) is similar in flavor to Melvin Eisenberg’s argument that there is an implicit
“duty to rescue” in contract law, as expressed through doctrines that require cooperative
behavior between parties. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 647, 675 (2002). He points to the doctrines of mitigation and offer and
acceptance, among others, as evidence that more is required of parties in a contractual
setting than in tort or criminal law. Id. at 654. This Essay does not rely on these doctrines
to illustrate its point; this Essay relies instead on doctrines that create rights in promisees
through contract, which apply only after contract formation.
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not primarily lie in any material harm inflicted on the promisee, contract
law will often not apply and damages will not be available. But in those
arms-length relations in which contract typically operates, the harm stems
not from damage done to the relationship between the parties, but from
the economic loss to the promisee—hence the appropriateness of eco-
nomic damages.
The commitment to pay damages is useful in many respects, but one
of the salutary effects of such a commitment is to reduce the chances that
new opportunities will render breach attractive to oneself and damaging
to the other party (that is, bad circumstantial luck). Should new facts
make performance unappealing, one must weigh the losses that the other
party would experience in one’s own decision whether to respect the bar-
gain made. Should one conclude that breach is nevertheless rational
from a self-interested point of view, the prospect of damages makes com-
pensation to the other party rational. Anticipating the possibility of a new
interest in nonperformance and altering one’s future self-interest in ways
that are beneficial to the other party is a familiar story of credible com-
mitment. It is also a less familiar means by which to align rational self-
interest with moral obligation and thereby manage one’s moral risk.
Contract law also manages postformation risk by limiting the conse-
quences of a party’s refusal to renegotiate in good faith. Existing doctrine
permits good faith modifications that stem from a substantial increase in
cost.161 It does not require such modifications, but should a party refuse a
modification where the burden of performance would be too great, the
court may void the contract altogether.162 Thus, a party who is faced with
a request for modification, who is unlikely to have complete information
with respect to the magnitude of the burden performance would entail
for the other party, may “risk” that her refusal will result in serious loss to
the other party knowing that, were this truly the case, the other party
could simply fail to perform and invoke the defense of impracticability,
impossibility, or frustration of purpose.163 As with the doctrines gov-
erning remedy, the doctrines governing both modification and excuse
combine to motivate a contracting party faced with a request for modifi-
cation to take that request more seriously than she might otherwise be
tempted to do. The bad material luck experienced by a contracting party
can be bad circumstantial luck for her contract partner, but rules that
effectively force the parties to share unusual burdens mitigate the mate-
rial risk of each party and the corresponding moral risk of the other.
161. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 cmt. b (1981) (describing provision
permitting modification of executory contract in event of circumstances not anticipated by
contract).
162. See id. § 261 (permitting discharge from contract in event terms become
impracticable); id. §§ 263 (permitting excuse from contract upon nonoccurrence of
specific thing necessary for performance); id. §§ 265–268 (allowing discharge by
supervening frustration, existing impracticability or frustration, and effect on other party’s
duties of prospective failure justified by impracticability or frustration).
163. See id. §§ 265–267 (defining the defenses).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-8\COL805.txt unknown Seq: 53 22-NOV-11 14:25
1930 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 111:1878
There are many explanations for each of these doctrines and the aim
of this Essay is not to explain these doctrines by reference to their role in
managing moral risk. This Essay, rather, points out how, by choosing to
enter into contract as opposed to simply promising, parties do more than
avail themselves of the state as a substitute for social networks of trust.
The state does more than assure the other party of our performance or
compensation in the event of nonperformance. Through contract law,
parties also opt into a kind of ready-made scheme by which they tie their
hands in more subtle ways, and in ways that make more likely their com-
pliance with the duty to keep promises. The idea is that credible commit-
ment not only makes more probable performance of obligations by alter-
ing incentives, but also minimizes the moral repercussions of whatever
choices parties ultimately make by limiting the consequences of those
choices.
The claim that law makes parties more likely to act morally begs the
question of whether they are still acting morally if it is just the law that is
making them act morally. If the rules limiting the negative impact of
choices are background, involuntary duties, those rules can be perceived
as mechanisms by which we mitigate risk only in the most general sense
in which the law is used collectively to address any range of moral chal-
lenges posed by the existence of other people with their own projects and
beliefs.164 But contract is unusual in that the rules managing risk, in ef-
fect hedging against the circumstantial facts which make breach more
likely, are ones that parties have themselves opted into. That is why they
are called voluntary obligations. It is the voluntary character of those
mechanisms for managing moral risk that makes contract unique as a way
in which parties engage directly in tradeoffs between their own interests
and those of the promisee. This Essay does not mean to rely on a fiction
that people make these commitments because they are motivated to man-
age moral risk. But individuals do not need to be motivated by a desire to
manage moral risk in order to properly understand certain private ac-
tions and legal rules as fulfilling that function.
CONCLUSION
Managing moral risk up front is a way of preserving space for amoral
decisionmaking in the future.165 We make some choices in order to exer-
cise moral agency, but not every choice we make is so laden with moral
import—or at least we do not wish it to be the case. Sometimes we help
make it possible to proceed amorally, relatively unburdened by moral
luck. As we make our way through the world, we pad our elbows so that
164. See Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1535, 1537–40
(1996) [hereinafter Waldron, Positivism] (discussing how positive law helps solve
normative challenge of living with others with their own values and viewpoints).
165. Cf. Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract
79 (2003) (stating contract facilitates personal detachment).
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our incidental blows on others are softer. The result is that we can move
more freely.
In Kant’s political theory, the state is morally compulsory because
justice is not possible outside of it.166 Only a third-party like the state is
capable of adjudicating disputes justly.167 By assuming the task of mediat-
ing between the claims asserted by individuals, the state not only makes it
possible for us to live justly, it also makes it possible for us to assert claims
without overtaxing our faculty of impartiality. In a similar fashion, instru-
ments of the law, which limit the harms we impose on others, facilitate
justice directly, but they also deliver a secondary benefit. Because we can
proceed in our ordinary transactions without burdensome attention to
our potential responsibility for the losses of others, we can pursue our
material interests without overtaxing our faculty of moral judgment.
We are, however, relieved of this burden only to the extent back-
ground institutions manage moral risk collectively and provide legal rules
that empower us to manage residual moral risk individually.
166. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 124 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
1996) (1785) [hereinafter Kant, Metaphysics]; see also Waldron, Positivism, supra note
164, at 1558 (discussing need for legislative will of state to ensure people uphold their R
obligations).
167. See Kant, Metaphysics, supra note 166, at 89–90 (“[H]owever well disposed and R
law-abiding men might be, it still lies . . . that before a public lawful condition is
established individual human beings . . . can never be secure against violence from one
another, since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to it . . . .”).
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